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I. JURISDICTION
A. IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION
IN FOWLER EVANGELISTIC ASS'N v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,'
the Eleventh Circuit held that a listing in a specialized
telephone directory did not create sufficient minimum
, 911 F.2d 1564 (11th Cir. 1990).
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contacts to make the listed business subject to personal
jurisdiction in a foreign forum. The suit arose when the
plaintiff's airplane crashed en route to Florida shortly af-
ter a Mississippi fixed base operator (FBO) had repaired
it. The Florida district court dismissed the plaintiff's suit
for lack of personal jurisdiction.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal, noting that
the FBO did not have offices, employees or agents in Flor-
ida and did not conduct any business in the state. Despite
being listed in the 1986-87 Aviation Telephone Directory,
whose distribution included Florida, the FBO had neither
paid for the listing nor purchased more prominent adver-
tising within the Directory. The court held that "[e]ven if
the basic listings are considered 'advertisements,' they are
not enough, without more, to provide contacts which
comport with due process."4 The court determined that
the "something more" was not satisfied by the FBO's
knowledge that the plane was headed to Florida rather
than to a location within Mississippi.5 Furthermore, it was
not satisfied by any foreseeability that the FBO would ser-
vice an airplane that would fly to Florida. Accordingly,
the Eleventh Circuit held that the trial court's dismissal
for lack of jurisdiction was proper.
B. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT (FSIA)
The Second Circuit in Barkanic v. General Administration
of Civil Aviation of the People's Republic of China 6 held that the
FSIA 7 implicitly required courts to apply choice-of-law
rules of the forum state concerning all issues governed by
state substantive law.8 In Barkanic, the estates of two
American citizens brought a wrongful death action after
their decedents were killed in the crash of a Chinese plane
2 Id. at 1566.
3 Id. at 1565.
4 Id. at 1566.
5Id.
6 923 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1991).
7 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988).
8 Barkanic, 923 F.2d at 959.
1992] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 5
en route from Nanking to Bejing, China. New York
choice-of-law rules were applied because it was the forum
state which led to the application of Chinese law.9 Apply-
ing Chinese substantive law, the airline's liability for the
wrongful death of a noncitizen was limited to $20,000.
In Antares Aircraft L.P. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,'0 the
court held that the defendants were immune from suit in
the United States because none of the statutory excep-
tions to the FSIA applied." A New York limited partner-
ship brought an action to recover damages for conversion
of an aircraft. The alleged conversion took place when
the Nigerian Airports Authority (NAA) wrongfully im-
posed parking and landing fees upon the partnership's
aircraft, blocking its removal until the fees were paid.
The NAA asserted it was an instrumentality of the Fed-
eral Republic of Nigeria and, therefore, entitled to avail
itself of sovereign immunity under the FSIA. The district
court agreed and rejected the plaintiffs' assertion that the
acts complained of fell into the exceptions set forth in 28
U.S.C. § 1605(a). It was determined that because the
forced transfer of funds was an indirect consequence of
the alleged tortious activity in Nigeria, the "direct effects"
test could not be used to invoke the commercial activities
exception of the FSIA.' 2 Simply because the NAA oper-
ated an international airport did not mean it was engaged
in commercial activity within the United States. Conse-
quently, the expropriation exception was Unavailable.' 3
Finally, the court noted that the noncommercial tort ex-
9 Id. at 960.
t0 No. CIV. 89-6513-JSM, 1991 WL 29287 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1), aff'd, 948 F.2d 90
(2d Cir. 1991),judgment vacated, 112 S. Ct. 3020 (1992).
H Id. at *4.
12 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) provides that immunity will not be available in cases
in which the activity is carried on "outside the territory of the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act
causes a direct effect in the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988).
13 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) provides that sovereign immunity will not be recog-
nized for an action "in which rights in property taken in violation of international
law are in issue and that [the] property . . . is present in the United States in
connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the for-
eign state .... 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1988).
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ception was unavailable because the allegedly tortious
conduct occurred outside the United States.14 Thus, the
court granted defendants' motion to dismiss.
In Schoenberg v. Exportadora de Sal, S.A. , 5 the Ninth Cir-
cuit stated "[a]lthough the general rule is 'that a federal
court sitting in diversity applies the conflict-of-law rules of
the state in which it sits,' [where] jurisdiction ... is based
on FSIA, not diversity .... federal common law applies to
the choice of law rule determination."' 16 Schoenberg was a
wrongful death suit brought against a Mexican corpora-
tion arising out of a fatal air crash that occurred in San
Diego, California, as the plane approached an airport in
Tijuana, Mexico. The court noted that federal common
law presumes that the law of the place where the injury
occurs applies, and because the presumption was not
overcome, California law was applied.17
In Trump Taj Mahal Assoc. v. Costruzioni Aeronautiche Gio-
vanni Agusta S.p.A.,"8 the New Jersey district court held re-
moval to federal district court was proper because
Costruzioni Aeronautiche Giovanni Agusta S.p.A.
(Agusta) was a "foreign state" under 28 U.S.C. § 1603.'9
The plaintiffs, employers of three executives who died
1 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) provides that immunity will not be recognized in an
action "against a foreign state for personal injury ... or damage to or loss of
property, occurring in the United States ...." 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1988).
15 930 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1991).
16 Id. at 782 (citations omitted).
17 Id. at 783.
18 761 F. Supp. 1143 (D.N.J. 1991).
19 28 U.S.C. § 1603 provides in part:
(a) A "foreign state" ... includes a political subdivision of a foreign
state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in
subsection (b).
(b) An "agency of instrumentality of a foreign state" means any en-
tity -
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise; and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or a political subdivision
thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is
owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof; and
(3) which is neither a citizen of the United States as defined in
section 1332(c) and (d) of this title, nor created under the laws of
any third country.
28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)-(b) (1988).
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when an Agusta A109 helicopter crashed, sued Agusta in
New Jersey state court for wrongful death damages.
Agusta removed the case to federal court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1604.20 Despite the plaintiff's assertion that
§ 1603(b)(2) did not contemplate that a private corpora-
tion could be owned by a foreign government, the court
held it was irrelevant whether the entity was a public cor-
poration or a private corporation, so long as the Italian
government held a majority interest.2
Furthermore, the plaintiffs' assertion that Agusta was a
citizen of the United States because it maintained a Dela-
ware based wholly-owned subsidiary was rejected by the
court. The Agusta court held that a foreign corporation
does not become a United States citizen by the mere fact
of its ownership of a United States subsidiary.2 2 A corpo-
ration is deemed to be a citizen of any state in which it has
its principal place of business,2 3 and Agusta's principal
place of business was Milan, Italy. Therefore, removal
was proper, and the court held for defendants on the
merits .24
C. FORUM NON CONVENIENS
In Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,25 the Third Circuit re-
versed the district court for the second time26 and held
that the nature of the balancing of public and private in-
terests articulated in GulfOil Corp. v. Gilbert 27 is essentially
20 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1988). The statute provides in part that "a foreign state
shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the
States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter." Id.
21 Trump Taj MahalAssoc., 761 F. Supp. at 1151.
22 Id.; see Bailey v. Grand Trunk Lines, 609 F. Supp. 48 (D. Vt. 1984), aff'd in
part, 805 F.2d 1097 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 826 (1987).
23 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1988).
24 Trump Taj Mahal Assoc., 761 F. Supp. at 1151.
25 932 F.2d 170 (3d Cir. 1991).
26 See Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 674 F. Supp. 10 (W.D. Pa. 1987), rev'd, 862
F.2d 38 (3d Cir. 1988), on remand, 736 F. Supp. 662 (W.D. Pa. 1990), rev'd, 932
F.2d 170 (3d Cir. 1990).
27 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947) (forum non conveniens analysis includes balancing
eleven private and public interest factors).
1992]
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qualitative.28 The court rejected a quantitative analysis
which would allow removal if the majority of factors were
satisfied. Lacey arose out of an aircraft crash in British Co-
lumbia, Canada, in which Lacey, an Australian citizen, was
severely burned. 29 Lacey brought suit in the Western Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania, the domicile of Hanlon & Wilson,
the manufacturer of the allegedly defective exhaust sys-
tem. The district court granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds and suggested
British Columbia was an appropriate alternative forum."
On appeal, a divided Third Circuit held that the district
court had abused its discretion by quantitatively evaluat-
ing the Gulf Oil factors, rather than engaging in a qualita-
tive analysis. 3  The district court had failed to accord
sufficient weight to the question of what difficulties Lacey
might face in obtaining discovery from nonparties who
were in possession of records relevant to the litigation.
One such non-party was Wall Colmonoy, an Oklahoma
based business, which had subsequently acquired Hanlon
& Wilson. The court stated "we have neither substituted
our judgment for that of the district court nor reduced the
multi-factor Gulf Oil/Piper32 analysis to one factor [access
to sources of proof]. We instead have read Piper as pre-
scribing a qualitative not quantitative balancing. ' 33 Thus,
the court remanded with orders to reconsider whether
British Columbia's discovery rules would afford the plain-
tiff access to essential sources of proof at trial with the
understanding that much of the evidence necessary to the
plaintiff's action might be outside of the defendant's
control.34
On remand, the district court determined that because
the plaintiff could not specifically state what witnesses and
28 Lacey, 932 F.2d at 182.
29 Id.
30 See Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 674 F. Supp. 10 (W.D. Pa 1987).
s Lacey, 932 F.2d at 182.
12 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 256 (1981).
33 Lacey, 932 F.2d at 186.
34 Id.
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documents were critical without discovery, it would be
speculation for the court to make such a determination. 35
The court stated "[i]n view of our singular lack of success
so far in addressing the issues which the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit deems vital on this
question, we refuse to engage in such speculation.
3 6
Consequently, the court denied defendants' motion to
dismiss. The court held that the case should proceed un-
til the close of discovery and that it would reexamine the
forum non conveniens issue if the defendants wanted to
represent it at that time.3 7
In Martino v. VARIG, S.A.,38 the court held that a party
dismissed on grounds of forum non conveniens was still
subject to the court's jurisdiction.3 9  The plaintiffs
brought suit in the United States against Boeing, the man-
ufacturer of an aircraft involved in a crash in Brazil. The
court granted Boeing's motion to dismiss on the grounds
of forum non conveniens. 40 However, the court's order
required Boeing to submit to service of process in Brazil,
waive certain aspects of any statute of limitations, comply
with federal court style discovery, and satisfy any judg-
ment rendered against it by a Brazilian court.4' Further-
more, should Boeing fail to satisfy any of the conditions,
the court stated it would reinstate jurisdiction upon re-
quest and reopen the action. The court did not explain its
authority to direct Boeing to comply with these orders,
nor did the court explain by what authority it could obtain
jurisdiction since its analysis had already led it to the con-
clusion that suit in the United States was improper.
In Myers v. Boeing Co. ,42 the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton criticized and declined to follow the "lesser defer-
15 Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 785 F. Supp. 1201, 1204 (W.D. Pa. 1992).
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 No. CIV.A.90-1883, 1991 WL 13886 (E.D. La. Jan. 25, 1991).
39 Id. at *7.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 794 P.2d 1272 (Wash. 1990).
19921
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ence" standard articulated by the United States Supreme
Court plurality in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno.43 The suit
arose as a result of a crash in which a Boeing 747 owned
by Japan Air Lines (JAL) crashed en route from Tokyo to
Osaka, Japan, killing 520 people. The court noted that
the ordinarily persuasive authority of Reyno was under-
mined by the fact that only a four-justice plurality con-
curred with the lesser in deference standard holding.44
Additionally, the court held Reyno "purports to be giving
lesser deference to the foreign plaintiffs' choice of forum
when, in reality, it is giving lesser deference to foreign
plaintiffs, based solely on their status as foreigners. ' 45 The
court questioned why it is less reasonable to assume that a
plaintiff, who is a Japanese citizen residing in Wenatchee,
Washington, who brings a suit in Washington, has chosen
a less convenient forum than a plaintiff from Florida
bringing the same suit. Finally, the court said it was un-
necessary to adopt the Reyno rationale because the GulfOil
factors, properly applied, were sufficient to ensure fair
and equitable results.4 6 Thus, the court affirmed dismissal
because the trial court had reached the proper conclusion
despite improper reasoning.4 7
D. REMOVAL
In Mignogna v. Sair Aviation, Inc. ,48 the court held that:
(1) an action against a Nonappropriated Fund Instrumen-
tality (NAFI) activity was not subject to removal as an ac-
tion against an "officer of the United States or [of] a
federal agency,"' 49 and (2) absent certainty that state court
jurisdiction would be barred, remand was required.50 In
Mignogna, a single-engine Mooney aircraft piloted by
4- See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 232.
44 Myers, 794 P.2d at 1280.
45 Id. at 1281.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 937 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1991).
49 Id. at 41.
50 Id. at 43.
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Mignogna crashed at the Burlington, Vermont Interna-
tional Airport. Mignogna commenced an action in state
court alleging that Hancock, a NAFI, had leased the air-
craft to Mignogna and that Mignogna suffered injuries in
the plane crash as a result of Hancock's negligence, reck-
lessness and carelessness. The United States petitioned
for removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) 5 t on the
ground that Hancock was an instrumentality of the federal
government by virtue of 5 U.S.C. § 2105(c)5 2 and 10
U.S.C. § 9779(c). 53 The district court accepted jurisdic-
tion and subsequently dismissed the case on other
grounds.
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that removal was
improper.5 4 The court determined that "Hancock, an im-
personal entity, was not an officer of the United States,
and thus could validly effect removal under section
1442(a)(1) only if that section authorized removal by an
'agency' of the United States."' 55 The court noted that in
International Primate Protection League v. Administrators of Tu-
lane Educational Fund,56 the United States Supreme Court
had recently ruled that 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) did not
provide the necessary authorization.5 7 In International Pri-
mate, the Supreme Court held, "when construed in the rel-
evant context, the first clause of § 1442(a)(1) grants
51 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1988) provides:
A civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a state court
against any of the following persons may be removed by them to the
district court of the United States for the district and division em-
bracing the place wherein it is pending:
(1) Any officer of the United States or any agency thereof, or per-
son acting under him, for any act under color of such office or on
account of any right, title or authority claimed under any Act of Con-
gress for the apprehension or punishment of criminals or the collec-
tion of the revenue.
52 5 U.S.C. § 2105(c) (1988) describes which individuals are considered govern-
ment employees when they are paid from nonappropriated funds and states that
NAFI's are instrumentalities of the federal government.
53 10 U.S.C. § 9779(b) (1988).
54 937 F.2d at 41.
55 Id. at 40.
56 111 S. Ct. 1700 (1991).
57 937 F.2d at 40.
19921
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removal power to only one grammatical subject, '[a]ny of-
ficer,' which is then modified by a compound preposi-
tional phrase: 'of the United States or [of] any agency
thereof.' -58 Consequently, jurisdiction was improper be-
cause 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(2) did not authorize an agency
to remove an action. 9
However, the court noted that remand might be im-
proper if it would be futile. This would exist, for exam-
ple, if the state court could not exercise jurisdiction over
Mignogna's claim against Hancock.60 In International Pri-
mate, the Supreme Court recognized the possibility of a
futility exception to the explicit remand rule of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c), and determined that they were precluded from
determining futility of a remand due to uncertainties of
the case.6 ' The Second Circuit noted that the govern-
ment's petition for removal asserted only that the NAFI's
activities were considered instrumentalities of the federal
government and did not assert that appropriated funds
were at stake in the litigation.62 The court noted that
Congress had clearly expressed its intention that no ap-
propriated funds be used to support NAFI activities and
that revenue from nonappropriated fund activities must
be severed from general federal revenues.65 Therefore,
NAFI funds had an identity apart from that of treasury
funds. The court held NAFI might be subject to claims
directly against them and their nonappropriated assets, as
distinct from claims against the United States and the
public fisc. 64 Consequently, the court held a remand to
state court would not be futile because it was uncertain
whether Hancock possessed assets subject to state court
jurisdiction.65
58 111 S. Ct. at 1705.
5 Id. at 1709.
937 F.2d at 41.
61 111 S. Ct. at 1709.
62 937 F.2d at 43.
63 Id. at 42 (citing United States v. Hopkins, 427 U.S. 123, 125 (1976)).
64 937 F.2d at 42.
65 Id. at 43.
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In Vail v. Pan Am Corp. ,66 the court held that the plain-
tiffs' claims were not preempted by the complete preemp-
tion doctrine 67 and remanded the action to state court.
The plaintiffs, whose decedents died when Flight 103
crashed near Lockerbie, Scotland, sued Pan Am in New
Jersey state court, alleging fraud, consumer fraud, and
breach of contract because Pan Am had represented that
it was implementing a sophisticated security system which
it did not in fact implement. Pan Am removed the action
to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdic-
tion and plaintiffs sought remand.
The court noted that federal question jurisdiction can
only be established if a federal cause of action was
presented in a well-pleaded complaint. 68 The plaintiffs
had intentionally not met this requirement. Nonetheless,
Pan Am asserted removal was proper because it intended
to assert that the Federal Aviation Act (the Act) 69 pre-
empted the plaintiffs' state law claims. The court noted,
however, that a case may not be removed to federal court
on the basis of a federal defense to a state law claim.7 °
The court also rejected Pan Am's assertion that the "com-
plete preemption" doctrine converted plaintiffs' state
claim into one stating a federal claim for the purposes of
the well-pleaded complaint rule. 7' The court held that for
the Act to create removal jurisdiction, the Act "must con-
tain a civil enforcement provision and such provision
must have been intended by Congress to create a basis for
removal. ' 72 Thus, removal jurisdiction was not proper
because the Act contained no such provision.73
66 752 F. Supp. 648 (D.N.J. 1990).
67 Id. at 656; see Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968) (em-
ployer's state claim under a no-strike clause was deemed to have arisen under the
laws of the United States).
" Vail, 752 F. Supp. at 655 (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386,
392 (1987)).
69 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(1) (West Supp. 1991).
70 Vail, 752 F. Supp. at 655 (quoting Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393).




14 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [58
E. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
In Stewart v. American Airlines, Inc. ,74 the court held that
state law claims of negligent maintenance were not com-
pletely preempted by federal law and remanded the action
to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.75 The
plaintiff alleged that he was injured when the airplane he
was travelling in suffered a deflated nose wheel and began
shaking. He sued in Texas state court alleging the de-
fendants were negligent in failing to properly maintain
their aircraft, failing to correct unsafe conditions and con-
tracting with and transporting passengers on a regional
carrier which did not properly maintain its aircraft. The
defendants removed the action to federal court relying on
the "complete pre-emption" doctrine.76
The defendants noted that the Federal Aviation Act
specifically pre-empted all state law claims to the extent
that such claims "relat[e] to rates, routes or services or
any air carrier .... "77 The defendants asserted that the
plaintiff's claims were necessarily related to services and
were therefore pre-empted. The court rejected the de-
fendants' argument for two reasons. Initially, the cases
supporting defendants' position "involved services pro-
vided by individual airline employees directly to passen-
gers, such as ticketing, boarding, in-flight service, and the
like," whereas in the present case, plaintiff's claims did
not arise out of the allegedly negligent performance of
such services. 78 Secondly, assuming the defendants' as-
sertion were valid, then most if not all state law claims
would be preempted by the Act. 79 However, the court
noted several federal decisions in which such claims were
not preempted."0 Moreover, the court noted that the
74 776 F. Supp. 1194 (S.D. Tex. 1991).
75 Id. at 1199-1200.
76 See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987).
17 Stewart, 776 F. Supp. at 1196 (quoting 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(1) (West
Supp. 1991)).
78 776 F. Supp. at 1197.
79 Id. at 1198.
80 Id.
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Fifth Circuit had recently held jurisdiction was properly
retained in an indistinguishable case. In Seidman v. Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc. ,81 a plaintiff incurred injuries following an
aircraft captain's orders to evacuate the airplane by using
the emergency slides. The plaintiff brought a diversity ac-
tion in federal district court alleging solely state law
claims. The Stewart court noted that had the Act com-
pletely preempted the plaintiff's state law claims, the dis-
trict court would have had no basis for retaining subject
matter jurisdiction."2 In that case, the Fifth Circuit would
have been obliged to dismiss the appeal on its own mo-
tion. Because the Fifth Circuit did not dismiss in Seidman,
the Stewart court held that the Act did not preempt Stew-
art's claims.8 3 Therefore defendants' "complete preemp-
tion" position was without merit.8 4
In Lloyd's Syndicate 609 v. United States,s5 underwriters at
Lloyd's brought a subrogation action against the United
States in federal court seeking reimbursement of a one-
time one million dollar payment to its insured, Helitaxi,
Ltd. Helitaxi was the Colombian owner of a Grumman G-
1 Aircraft which was declared a total loss as a result of
extensive damage suffered during the United States bom-
bardment of Panama's Paitilla Airport in 1989.
Underwriters asserted jurisdiction under the Prize
Act,8 6 the Federal Tort Claim Act (FTCA),s 7 the Suits in
Admiralty Act,8 8 the Public Vessels Act, 9 the Foreign
Claims Act, 90 and the All Writs Act.9' The court rejected
81 923 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1991).
82 Stewart, 776 F. Supp. at 1200.
83 Id.
84 Id.
8- 780 F.Supp. 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
Id. at 1000. The Prize Act and the Prize Law permit suits in Federal Court to
determine title or payment for items captured during times of belligerency which
are intended for use by the United States or its agents. See U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 2; 28 U.S.C. 88 1333, 1356 (1988).
87 28 U.S.C §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1988).
88 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 741-752 (1988).
89 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-790 (1988).
90 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (1988).
91 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1988).
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each basis of jurisdiction and dismissed the action.9"
The court first held the destruction of property during
combat was not a taking, capture or seizure within the
meaning of the Prize Act.93 The court stated:
To rule otherwise is to suggest that the United States
would be liable for the wartime destruction of any prop-
erty owned by any person, save for that either owned or
being used by the armed forces of the other belligerent
nation. This clearly is not and cannot be the law.94
Underwriters also asserted that jurisdiction was sup-
ported because the United States had waived sovereign
immunity. However, the court held that even if that asser-
tion were true, jurisdiction was improper.95 The court
noted that the FTCA did not apply because the claim did
not arise within the United States.9 6 The Suits in Admi-
ralty Act and the Public Vessels Act were inapplicable be-
cause land forces, not vessels, were responsible for the
damage to the aircraft. 97 And finally, as neither the For-
eign Claims Act nor the All Writs Act contained a waiver
of sovereign immunity provision, they did not supply
grounds for exercising jurisdiction." Accordingly, the
court granted the United States' motion to dismiss. 99
In RLI Insurance Co. v. United States Aviation Underwriters
Inc.,'00 following Carden v. Arkoma Associates,I °' the court
held that the citizenship of every member of an unincor-
porated entity must be considered for diversity pur-
poses. 10 2 RLI, a citizen of Illinois, sued United States
Aviation Underwriters, Inc. (USAU), a citizen of New
York, for injuries incurred in an aircraft crash. USAU was
92 Lloyd's, 780 F. Supp. at 1000-01.
95 Id. at 1000.
4 Id.
9s Id.
0 See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1988).
97 Loyd's, 780 F. Supp. at 1000-01.
98 Id. at 1001,
9 Id.
-00 739 F. Supp. 1219 (N.D. I1. 1990).
10, 494 U.S. 185 (1990).
102 RLS Ins. Co., 739 F. Supp. at 1221.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
also the aviation manager for United States Aircraft Insur-
ance Group (USAIG), a coalition of independent insur-
ance companies who had insured the aircraft's owner.
Two USAIG members were Illinois citizens. The court
held that an action brought against USAU necessarily in-
cluded USAIG as the real party in interest. 0 3 The court
viewed USAU and USAIG as two partners, each of whom
performed a particular task for the benefit of the partner-
ship. Because the action involved a matter related to the
business of the single entity comprised of USAU and
USAIG, such as providing insurance for all aviation risks,
it was appropriate to consider the citizenship of every
member of USAIG. Because USAIG, a coalition of in-
dependent insurance companies, included members with
the same citizenship as the plaintiff, diversity was de-
stroyed and the case was dismissed for lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction.
In Rodrigue v. United States,' °4 the court held that claims
settled under the Military Claims Act (MCA)10 5 were final
with respect to administrative review only and not with re-
spect to judicial review.'0 6 The plaintiff alleged the
United States Air Force owed his son, an airman, a duty to
rescue him from drowning. The Department of the Air
Force rejected the plaintiff's claim for damages because
the airman's death was "incident to service." The plaintiff
exhausted his administrative remedies and filed suit in
federal court seeking a declaratory judgment stating that
the Air Force misinterpreted the "incident to service" ex-
ception. The United States filed a motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The court reviewed the legislative history of the MCA
to determine the meaning of "final and conclusive". The
court noted that in the section entitled "purpose of the
Legislation" the United States Senate had stated: "The
o3 Id. at 1220.
- 760 F. Supp. 223 (D. Mass. 1991).
t05 10 U.S.C. §§ 2731-2737 (1988).
-6 Rodrique, 760 F. Supp. at 226.
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proposed legislation would be consistent with the cited
general policy of preventing other agencies of the Govern-
ment from reviewing and reversing actions on claim set-
tlements of agencies specifically authorized to settle and
pay certain claims."'' 0 7 Therefore, the language did not
preclude judicial review. Consequently, the court held
that it had subject matter jurisdiction of plaintiff's
claim.10 8
F. ABSTENTION
In Neuchatel Swiss General Insurance Co. v. Lufthansa Air-
lines,'0 9 the pendency of parallel proceedings in Geneva,
Switzerland was an insufficient justification to apply the
Colorado River abstention doctrine. 110 The suit arose out
of an ordinary commercial dispute over the loss of cargo
involving the owner, the consignee, the cargo's insurer,
and the air carrier to whom the cargo was entrusted. The
Ninth Circuit held that a federal court owes less deference
to a foreign court than to a state court."' That the paral-
lel proceeding was pending in a foreign jurisdiction
weighed in favor of retaining jurisdiction, not
abstaining." 12
II. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
A. EAST RIVER STEAMSHIP DOCTRINE" 3
Many cases follow the lead of the United States
Supreme Court in East River and hold that an action in
107 Id. at 225-26 (quoting S.REP. No. 1056, 92d Cong., 2nd Sess., 5 (1972), re-
printed in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3106, 3109-10).
108 760 F. Supp. at 226.
-0 925 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1991).
11 Id. at 1194; see Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,
424 U.S. 800, 818 (1976) (absent "exceptional circumstances," federal courts
have an obligation to exercise their jurisdiction concurrently with other courts).
- Lufthansa, 925 F.2d at 1195.
112 Id.
113 East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986)
(striking tort claims of oil-tanker operator which brought negligence and strict
liability action against manufacturer of propulsion engine which malfunctioned
causing commercial losses).
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tort may not be maintained between commercial parties
for economic losses arising from a defective product when
there is no injury other than to the product itself."4
The issue of what constitutes damage to "other prop-
erty" has been addressed as well. In Lease Navajo, Inc. v.
Cap Aviation, Inc.,' ' for example, the court held that the
failure of an engine component which caused the whole
engine to explode constituted damage to other distinct
property and did not preclude an action solely for eco-
nomic damages. "6 In Lease Navajo, the plaintiffs brought
a successful action against Cap Aviation Inc. (Cap) for
damage sustained when two aircraft engines rebuilt by
Cap exploded. Subsequently, Cap filed a third-party com-
plaint against the engine manufacturer, Avco Lycoming,
for contribution and indemnity. Cap asserted Lycoming
breached its warranties of merchantability and fitness be-
cause the engine's technical manual directed Cap to re-
build the engine with outdated components. Cap sought
recovery of the costs incurred in repairing the aircraft, re-
placing the engines and cores, and travelling to the loca-
tion of the explosion to complete the repairs. Lycoming
moved for summary judgment, asserting that Penn-
sylvania does not allow recovery by a commercial pur-
chaser against a manufacturer of a product in a tort action
where the only injury is to the product itself.
The court denied Lycoming's motion, distinguishing
cases where a plaintiff purchased a multi-part integrated
product and a single part failed.' '7 In integrated purchase
114 E.g., King v. Hilton-Davis, 855 F.2d 1047, 1050-54 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. de-
nied, 488 U.S. 1030 (1989) (applying East River to case involving allegedly defec-
tive sprout suppressant used on seed potatoes); Aloe Coal Co. v. Clark Equip.
Co., 816 F.2d 110, 118 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 853 (1987) (applying East
River principle to Pennsylvania products liability case involving fire damage to a
tractor); McKernan v. United Technologies Corp., 717 F. Supp. 60, 62-64 (D.
Conn. 1989); Florida Power & Light Co. v. McGraw Edison Co., 696 F. Supp. 617,
619-20 (S.D. Fla. 1988), aff'd, 875 F.2d 873 (11th Cir. 1989) (applying East River
to case involving economic damages caused by transformer explosion at power
generating plant).
"1 760 F. Supp. 455 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
116 Id. at 460.
17 Id. at 459; see also Aloe Coal Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 816 F.2d 110 (3d Cir.
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cases, whether the destruction was either to the single
part only, or to the entire unit, the courts have held the
damage was to the product itself.I"8 However, in the pres-
ent case the engines and the allegedly defective compo-
nents were not purchased as an integrated unit. Rather,
Cap purchased a component part which it then installed
in a Lycoming engine. The court stated that "[n]owhere
does it appear that Cap Aviation purchased the engines
and the components as a whole. The failure of the com-
ponent caused damage to other distinct property. '" 9
Reaching the contrary result in Petroleum Helicopters, Inc.
v. Avco Corp. ,1o the court held that an emergency flotation
device was a "component part" of a helicopter, was not
"other property," and therefore the owner could not
maintain a strict products liability claim under maritime
tort law.' 2' Petroleum Helicopters sought recovery for
damages sustained by its helicopter when it capsized after
the defendant's emergency flotation device failed. The
float had been manufactured according to the helicopter
manufacturer's specifications and assembled and sold as
an integrated whole. The failed float was not original
equipment on the crashed helicopter because the plaintiff
routinely interchanged floats between similar helicopters.
The district court held that East River applied to the case
and granted summary judgment for defendants which was
affirmed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 2 2 The
court also held that the plaintiff's recovery was governed
by the terms of its contract and agreed that the plaintiff
should not be able to interchange the flotation devices
and thereby create an additional non-warranty remedy. 23
1987) (faulty hose mechanism damaged entire shovel unit); Hammerville Paper
Co. v. C.T. Main Constr., Inc., 662 F. Supp. 816 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (heating tubes in
boiler failed destroying boiler).
118 Cap Aviation, 760 F. Supp. at 459.
119 Id.
120 930 F.2d 389 (5th Cir. 1991).
121 Id. at 393.
122 Id. at 389.
,25 Id. at 393.
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Similarly, in National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh,
PA v. Pratt and Whitney Canada, Inc. ,124 the Supreme Court
of Nevada held that an airplane engine and the airplane
itself are a single integrated product for the purposes of a
law suit in products liability, 25 The action arose out of
the total loss of a Piper Model PA-3 IT Cheyenne II which
crashed when a compressor blade in one of two Pratt and
Whitney Model PT6A-28 engines malfunctioned. The
court recognized that the engine was a defective compo-
nent part of the Piper and arguably destroyed other prop-
erty, i.e., the entire airplane. The court agreed, however,
with the United State's Supreme Court's reasoning in East
River that "[s]ince all but the very simplest of machines
have component parts, [a contrary] holding would require
a finding of 'property damage' in virtually every case
where a product damages itself. Such a holding would
eliminate the distinction between warranty and strict
products liability." 126
The court was greatly persuaded by the availability of
insurance to cover such risks. The court stated:
"[c]ommercial products that may, for whatever reason, in-
jure themselves are readily insured and suitable for inclu-
sion within the economic loss doctrine. . . .When a
product 'injures itself' protection derived from the inter-
play of manufacturer's warranties and insurance supplies
a generally adequate basis for consumer redress."'' 27 For
similar reasons, the court held that tort damages were not
available even though the product crashed calamitously
and exposed persons to unreasonable risks of harm. 2 1
Consequently, plaintiffs' subrogee could not recover from
the manufacturer on a strict liability theory because the
damage was an economic loss.
124 815 P.2d 601 (Nev. 1991).
125 Id. at 604.
126 Id. (quoting East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858,
867 (1985) (quoting Northern Power & Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
623 P.2d 324, 330 (Alaska 1981))).
127 815 P.2d at 604-05.
18 Id. at 605.
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In Aris Helicopters, Ltd. v. Allison Gas Turbine,129 the Ninth
Circuit held East River would control the resolution of a
California tort action only if it were brought in admi-
ralty.' 30 The plaintiff alleged it incurred economic dam-
ages because its helicopter crashed due to defendants'
defective design and manufacture.' 3' The court held that
proper authority in California is Scandinavian Airlines System
v. United Aircraft Corp.,132 which adopted the rule enunci-
ated in Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Westinghouse Electronic Corp..133
Although the district court applied the proper test, the
Ninth Circuit held that the court erred by dismissing the
complaint for failure to state a claim. 3 4 The court also
determined the Kaiser Steel factors were too complicated to
be determined on a motion to dismiss.13 5
B. GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
In Skyline Air Service, Inc. v. G. L. Capps Co. ,136 the Fifth
Circuit held that the failure to provide the original gov-
ernment contract did not preclude partial summary judg-
ment on the issue of the government contractor
defense. 37 In Skyline, a military surplus Bell Model UK-
lB helicopter owned by Skyline Air Service, Inc. crashed
during a log hauling operation. The crash killed the pilot
and damaged the aircraft extensively. The National
Transportation Safety Board concluded the crash was
caused by engine failure. Americas Insurance Company
- 932 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1991).
130 Id. at 827.
"' Plaintiffs alleged the crash of the helicopter caused damage to the helicopter
itself and a loss of income to Aris along with additional insurance expenses and
the expenses of the lease for a substitute helicopter in the total amount of
$509,677.33. Id. at 826.
132 601 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1979).
'33 127 Cal. Rptr. 838, 845 (1976) (product liability does not apply between
parties who (1) "deal in a commercial setting;" (2) are in "positions of relatively
equal economic strength;" (3) "bargain the specifications of the product;" and (4)
"negotiate concerning the risk of loss from defects" in the product).
134 Allison Gas Turbine, 932 F.2d at 827.
1- Id.
136 916 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1990).
37 Id. at 980.
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filed a subrogation claim against Bell and others. Bell
moved for summary judgment, raising the government
contractor defense.
The court applied the three-part test set forth in Boyle v.
United Technologies Corp. 138 In Boyle, the United States
Supreme Court held,
liability for design defects in military equipment cannot be
imposed, pursuant to state law, when: 1) the United States
approved reasonably precise specifications; 2) the equip-
ment conformed to those specifications; and 3) the sup-
plier warned the United States about the dangers in the
use of the equipment that were known to the supplier but
not to the United States.139
The Skyline court held Bell's inability to produce the origi-
nal government contract for the crashed helicopter did
not prevent satisfaction of the first prong of the Boyle
test.140 The court found Bell had presented sufficient evi-
dence to establish that the United States approved rea-
sonably precise specifications, especially in light of the
plaintiff's failure to challenge any of the information or
produce contradictory evidence.' 4' Similarly, Bell was
able to produce sufficient evidence to satisfy the second
and third prongs. Therefore, summary judgment was
appropriate.
In In re Air Crash Litigation Frederick, Maryland, 42 the
court held that the government contractor defense applies
where the "discretionary function" exception to the
FTCA would prevent liability on the part of the federal
government in the area of military procurement. 43 The
case arose when an Air Force EC-135N aircraft crashed
killing all aboard. The personal representatives of the
military and civilian decedents brought a products liability
138 Id. at 979; Boyle, 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
139 487 U.S. at 512.
140 G.L. Capps, 916 F.2d at 979-80.
14' Id. at 980.
142 752 F. Supp. 1326 (S.D. Ohio 1990), aff'd sub nom, Darling v. Boeing Co.,
935 F.2d 269 (6th Cir. 1991).
143 Id. at 1336.
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suit alleging that the aircraft was defectively designed.
The court engaged in an extensive analysis and held that
Boeing, the aircraft manufacturer, Lear, the manufacturer
of the allegedly defective autopilot, and McDonnell Doug-
las Corporation, the aftermarket installer of the autopilot,
were all entitled to immunity as a matter of law. The
court held that approval of "reasonably precise specifica-
tions" was satisfied because the government had exer-
cised its discretion with regard to the design of the
particular piece of equipment, instead of simply ordering
it from stock. 44 Discretion was expressed through engi-
neering analysis, through the exercise of judgment re-
garding technical and military factors, and through the
evaluation of trade-offs between safety and mission effec-
tiveness. The court noted that if the three Boyle elements
were met, the requisite "significant conflict" was present
and state law claims were preempted. 4- Furthermore, the
court rejected the plaintiffs' assertion that the defendants
were negligent in failing to flight-test the aircraft, and
therefore Boyle was inapplicable. The negligence claims
were indistinguishable from the defective design allega-
tions to which Boyle was applicable and were also
barred. 146
C. PROOF OF DEFECT
In Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,"4 the Tenth Circuit,
applying New Mexico law, held that an initial tortfeasor,
whose negligence may be deemed to have proximately
caused all of the injuries, is or at least may be a concur-
rent tortfeasor with a crashworthiness tortfeasor as to the
enhanced injuries.' 48 Cleveland arose from a bizarre set of
facts. A Piper Super Cub Model PA-18-150 aircraft taking
off from Mid-Valley Airport in Los Lunas, New Mexico,
144 Id. at 1335.
145 Id. at 1336.
146 Id. at 1364.
147 890 F.2d 1540 (10th Cir. 1989).
148 Id. at 1549.
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crashed into a van deliberately parked on the runway by
the airport owner. The owner had previously warned
Cleveland, the pilot, that he was suspending airport oper-
ations because certain glider flights were not in compli-
ance with Federal Aviation Administration regulations.
The collision injured the pilot, who was sitting in the rear
seat, which was equipped only with a lap belt, not a shoul-
der harness. He was thrown into a camera affixed to the
front seat. The camera was installed to film a glider at-
tached to the plane by a tow line. Cleveland sued Piper
alleging that the aircraft was defectively designed because
it had inadequate forward vision (the initial collision
claim) and because it lacked a rear seat shoulder harness
(the crashworthiness claim). The jury found Piper's negli-
gence accounted for 41.7% of the initial collision dam-
ages and 91.6% of the crashworthiness damages. The
court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an
amount derived by multiplying the total damages
($2,500,000) by the percentage of fault allocated to the
initial collision. Because the plaintiff sustained only head
injuries, the jury found 100% of plaintiff's injuries were
attributable to the airplane's lack of a rear shoulder
harness.
The plaintiff asserted that the initial and crashworthi-
ness tortfeasors were successive tortfeasors because no in-
juries were attributable to the initial collision. The
plaintiff further asserted that New Mexico's pure compar-
ative fault law was inapplicable because it eliminated joint
and several liability only as between concurrent
tortfeasors. Consequently, the plaintiff contended that
the district court erred in entering judgment on the first
collision claim instead of on the crashworthiness claim be-
cause the negligence of the initial tortfeasors should not
have been compared to the negligence of the crashworthi-
ness tortfeasors.
The court acknowledged that the jury's finding that
100% of the damages were attributable to the
crashworthiness injuries represented an implicit finding
1992]
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that the plaintiff would not have received any injuries as a
result of the initial collision. The court, however, de-
clined to accept the plaintiff's reasoning that the verdict
also represented an implicit finding that the negligence of
the original tortfeasors was not a proximate cause of the
crashworthiness injuries. 149 Even though the relationship
was that of successive tortfeasors, the court noted that
under New Mexico law both the initial tortfeasors and the
crashworthiness tortfeasors may be liable for the second
collision or enhanced injuries. 50 Nevertheless, because
the verdict form did not permit the jury to compare the
negligence of the initial tortfeasors with that of the
crashworthiness tortfeasors, the court remanded for a
new trial. 151
D. NON-LIABILITY FOR FORMER MANUFACTURERS
In Goldsmith v. Olon Andrews, Inc. ,152 the Sixth Circuit, ap-
plying Ohio law, held that a manufacturer who had ceased
manufacturing a product and who no longer sold the de-
sign for that product was not a seller for the purposes of
establishing liability under Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 402A. 153 In 1984, Andrews and Goldsmith were injured
when Andrews' Bell 47 helicopter crashed and caught fire.
The plaintiffs' injuries were primarily due to the fire and
Andrews died as a result of burn injuries. The plaintiffs
brought suit alleging Bell was strictly liable because it had
negligently designed the Bell 47's fuel system.
The court found the following facts: (1) the crashed he-
licopter had been assembled by Olympic Helicopters, a
third party, from spare, new, and surplus parts acquired
from various sources, including Bell; (2) Bell had ceased
manufacturing the Bell 47 in 1974; however, it had con-
tinued to provide product support to operators of Model
149 Id. at 1548.
1- Id. at 1550.
51 Id. at 1557.
152 941 F.2d 423 (6th Cir. 1991).
,55 Id. at 427.
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47s; and (3) in 1976, Bell improved the crashworthiness
of the fuel system for the Model 47 by providing retrofit
kits for fiberglass-wrapped fuel tanks and breakaway fit-
tings for the fuel lines. Bell notified existing owners, in-
cluding Olympic, of the improvement. Olympic, however,
had not included the improvements because FAA regula-
tions did not require their inclusion on existing
helicopters.
The court held that in order to satisfy the rationale for
strict liability, Bell must be deemed a seller. 54 The court
noted Bell had never licensed, sanctioned, nor approved
Olympic's use of Bell's design to manufacture the helicop-
ter. Furthermore, Bell did not control production of the
helicopter, could not assure conformity with its improved
designs, and was in no position to treat the risks of pro-
ducing the helicopter as costs of production or to obtain
liability insurance. 55 Consequently, the court affirmed
the lower court's grant of a directed verdict in favor of
Bell. 156
E. EVIDENCE
1. Evidence of pilot's prior navigational error.
In Galowich v. Beech Aircraft Corp. ,'7 the court held that
the evidence of a pilot's prior conduct was relevant to
prove what actually happened at the time of the acci-
dent. "'58 The plaintiff's decedent died when his Beech
King Air B-90 crashed on approach to the Joliet Airport.
The plaintiff alleged the crash occurred because the air-
craft's left propeller went into reverse pitch, and the
plaintiff further asserted that evidence of the pilot's con-
duct prior to the crash was irrelevant. The court noted,
however, that the evidence showed that the pilot was spa-
tially disoriented throughout the entire hour-long flight.
114 Id. at 426.
15, Id. at 427.
156 Id.
.57 568 N.E.2d 46 (1991).
158 Id. at 51.
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The court held that the evidence was unlike a momentary
aberration which, if uncontradicted, would allow a finding
that the conditions were the same until the moment of the
crash.' 59 Instead, the court held that the evidence tended
to show what probably happened and the evidence sup-
ported a reasonable inference that the conduct involved
continued from the point of observation to the place of
the accident. 60
2. Miscellaneous
In Western Helicopter Services, Inc. v. Rogerson Aircraft
Corp.,16t the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for relief
from summary judgment on the basis of newly discovered
evidence. 62 In Western Helicopter, the plaintiffs' decedent
was killed in a helicopter crash caused by the failure of the
helicopter's main rotor blade fork. The district court re-
jected the plaintiffs' theory that because the defendant
was the sole supplier of forks to the plaintiff during the
period in which the accident fork was installed, the de-
fendant's fork was the accident fork. Consequently, the
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defend-
ant because the plaintiffs had produced no evidence that
the accident fork was manufactured by the defendant. 63
Two weeks prior to the entry ofjudgment, the plaintiffs'
expert examined and tested certain forks. After entry of
judgment, based on those tests, the plaintiffs' expert con-
cluded that the defendant had manufactured the accident
fork. The plaintiffs moved for reconsideration, which the
court granted. 64
The court noted that in order to grant relief, the mo-
159 See Klavine v. Hair, 331 N.E.2d 355 (Il. App. Ct. 1975) (evidence that plain-
tiff glanced into the glove compartment moments prior to the accident was
inadmissible).
-s 568 N.E.2d at 51.
1 768 F. Supp. 751 (D. Or. 1991).
162 Id. at 754.
163 Id. at 755.
'64 Western Helicopter Services, Inc. v. Rogerson Aircraft Corp., 777 F. Supp.
1543 (D. Or. 1991).
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vant must show that the evidence: (1) existed at the time
of the summary judgment, (2) could not have been discov-
ered through due diligence, and (3) was of such magni-
tude that production of it earlier would have been likely to
change the disposition of the case. 65 The court held the
first factor was satisfied because the forks did in fact exist
at the time the motion was filed. The court held the sec-
ond factor was also satisfied despite the defendant's asser-
tion that the plaintiffs could have been more dogged in
pursuing examination of the forks. The court held that
the record reflected the plaintiffs' diligent pursuit of that
and other discovery. The court noted that a better course
of action would have been to file immediately a motion for
leave to file a supplemental memorandum in opposition
to the motion for summary judgment. The third factor
was satisfied because if the jury reasonably believed the
testimony of plaintiffs' expert, then it could reasonably
find that defendant manufactured the accident fork.1 66
In Gerhard v. Bell Helicopter Textron, 16 7 the plaintiff al-
leged that the helicopter he was piloting crashed because
of a defectively manufactured bell crank. The court
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment for a
variety of reasons. First, the plaintiffs were unable to pro-
duce metallurgical testimony to support their claim, and
the inability of their expert witness to conclude that the
bell crank was unsound did not raise a genuine issue of
material fact.' 68 Second, although the NTSB's conclusion
that the accident was probably caused by a defect was con-
sistent with the plaintiff's theory, NTSB's conclusions re-
garding the probable cause of a crash were not admissible
as evidence in a subsequent civil action arising out of the
crash. 169 Third, the affidavit of plaintiff's mechanical en-
gineering expert was conclusory and lacked specific
165 Id. at 1545 (citations omitted).
16 Id. at 1546.
167 759 F. Supp. 552 (D. Minn. 1991).
68 Id. at 555.
.69 49 U.S.C. § 1441(e) (1988).
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analysis. 170
F. PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE
In Fine v. Facet Aerospace Products Co. ,171 the court held
that a products liability plaintiff who raises a design defect
claim is entitled to broader discovery than if the claim
were solely one of negligent manufacture.1 72 In Fine, the
plaintiff alleged that a defective fuel system caused the
crash in which he was injured. Fine sought discovery of
numerous aircraft fuel systems. The manufacturer pro-
duced documents specifically relating to metal fuel tanks
or protruding vented fuel tanks like those installed in the
crashed aircraft, but argued discovery of other types of
systems was irrelevant. The court noted that under New
York law a plaintiff bears the burden of proving feasible
design alternatives that would have rendered the product
safer.' 7 3 The requested discovery was relevant, therefore,
to prove feasible alternatives. The court, however, still
denied Fine's discovery request because he had not spe-
cifically alleged the other fuel systems would be safer.
Had Fine made a threshold showing of relevance, for ex-
ample, through the affidavit of an expert in aviation engi-
neering, presumably, discovery would have been
allowed. 74
In In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City,' 75 the court
granted the defendants' motion for a protective order
prohibiting the plaintiffs from taking depositions of its pi-
lots in, or adjacent to, a flight simulator.' 76 The court
noted that the flight recorder provided direct evidence of
the events of the actual flight, and plaintiffs could ques-
tion crew members about the flight. Conversely, the sim-
ulator required programming before it could simulate the
170 Gerhard, 759 F. Supp. at 556.
17 133 F.R.D. 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
172 Id. at 442.
173 Id at 443.
174 Id. at 129.
17. 131 F.R.D. 127 (N.D. Il. 1990).
176 Id.
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flight. The court held that although conducting the depo-
sition while the crew members operated the flight simula-
tor may have "theatrical value," it was burdensome and
oppressive. 17 7
In Thomas Brooks Chartered v. Burnett, 7 8 the Tenth Circuit
held that the NTSB could invite manufacturers of a plane
and its component parts to participate in an NTSB investi-
gation without also allowing a representative of the indi-
vidual who was killed in the crash to participate as an
observer.' 79 The court noted that whether parties are
named to participate in the investigation is left to the dis-
cretion of the investigator-in-charge.' 8 0  When they are
picked, they are identified according to "who can provide
suitable qualified technical personnel to actively assist in
the field investigation."' 8' The court added: "An NTSB
investigation is a forum for developing safety recommen-
dations. It is not a show for an audience of silent note
takers looking for someone to sue."' 8 2 Because the NTSB
included in the record its reasons for denying participa-
tion,' 8 3 the court held that the decision was not arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with the law.' 8 4
177 Id. at 128.
178 920 F.2d 634 (10th Cir. 1990).
179 Id. at 636.
'so Id.
181 Id. at 637 (quoting 49 C.F.R. § 831.11(a) (1991)).
-82 Id. at 646.
"'3 The trial court noted that having a representative of the aircraft owner pres-
ent would impede the free flow of information between the NTSB and the manu-
facturer. Also, the court noted that if representation was allowed at the main
investigation site, the investigation might be delayed because the same people
might demand representation at remote test sites. Finally, the court noted that
the NTSB factual reports were available to the aircraft owner, and that the investi-
gators could be deposed. Id. at 640.
184 Id. at 647-48.
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III. FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT (FTCA)
A. DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION
In Tiffany v. United States,' 85 the Fourth Circuit held that
a claim which challenged military defense procedures in
intercepting an unidentified aircraft in restricted airspace
was not justiciable because it would violate the separation
of powers doctrine. 86 The plaintiffs' decedents were
killed in a mid-air collision between their Beech Baron air-
plane and a United States F-4C fighterjet. The decedent,
flying without a flight plan, entered an Air Defense Identi-
fication Zone as an unidentified and potentially hostile air-
craft. Military authorities dispatched two fighter jets to
visually identify the unknown plane, and the collision oc-
curred in poor weather conditions when one of the jets
instituted a sharp left bank to avoid the Baron. Tiffany's
widow brought suit under the Death on the High Seas Act
(DOHSA) 18 7 and Suits in Admiralty Act (SAA)t 8s alleging
that the military pilot and ground control had been negli-
gent in their conduct of the intercept.
The court noted that respect for separation-of-powers
principles addressed through the discretionary function
exception of the FTCA had been applied by analogy to
suits brought under DOHSA and SAA. ts 9 The court em-
phasized that the legislative and executive branches are
vested with exclusive authority to make discretionary deci-
sions regarding issues of actual military defense. The
court held that it was not for the judiciary to challenge the
legality, wisdom or propriety of military tactics.1 90 The
court also held that the propriety of regulations which ad-
dress intercept procedures were not for resolution by the
courts, but rather were best left to other branches of gov-
ernment with greater expertise and more direct political
-s' 931 F.2d 271 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 867 (1992).
186 Id. at 282.
187 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1988).
188 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752 (1988).
189 Tiffany, 931 F.2d at 276 (citations omitted).
- Id. at 279.
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accountability.'' Consequently, the court reversed the
lower court and remanded with directions to dismiss.19 2
In Redmon By And Through Redmon v. United States, l93 the
Tenth Circuit held that the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion's decision to allow single-engine instrument flight
rules (IFR) rated pilots to carry over their IFR rating to a
multiengine rating without a practical flight test fell
squarely within the discretionary function exception.'9 4
Likewise, after a rule change requiring a separate practical
test, the Administration's implementation of a grace pe-
riod for pilots who had already commenced multiengine
training fit within the exception. 9 5 In Redmon, the pilot of
a private plane was killed when his plane crashed during a
thunderstorm. The plaintiffs alleged that the Administra-
tion negligently certified the pilot to fly multiengine air-
craft in instrument flight conditions.
The court noted that 49 U.S.C. § 1421(a) empowered
the Secretary of Transportation "to issue airman certifi-
cates specifying the capacity in which the holders thereof
are authorized to serve as airmen."'' 9 6 Furthermore, the
Secretary was authorized to impose "such terms, condi-
tions, and limitations as to ... periodic or special exami-
nations . . . and other matters as the Secretary of
Transportation may determine to be necessary to assure
safety in air commerce."'' 9 7 The court held that the lan-
guage clearly implied discretion on the part of the Secre-
tary to promulgate regulations and procedures. 9 8
Consequently, the court remanded with instructions to
enter summary judgment for the United States. 99
In Musick v. United States, 0 0 the court held that the dis-
19, Id.
192 Id. at 282.
19- 934 F.2d 1151 (10th Cir. 1991).
194 Id. at 1156.
"9s Id. at 1156-57.
196 Id.
,97 49 U.S.C. app. § 1422(b)(1) (Supp. 1991).
198 934 F.2d at 1156.
-9 Id. at 1157.
200 768 F. Supp. 183 (W.D. Va. 1991).
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cretionary function exception to the FTCA20 ' did not pre-
clude the United States from liability for the act of an Air
Force pilot who flew his RF-4 aircraft within 300 feet of
the ground causing a tree limb to fall and strike a timber
cutter.20 2 Although prevailing military regulations limited
pilots to an altitude no lower than 100 feet above ground
level (AGL), a squadron policy in effect at the time of the
accident limited pilots to an altitude of no lower than 300
feet AGL. The evidence showed that the limb in question
could only have been separated from the tree if the RF-4
had been flying below 300 feet AGL.
The court distinguished Tiffany v. United States203 on the
ground that Tiffany involved a "real world/real time mili-
tary mission," whereas the present case involved a train-
ing mission.0 4 In Musick, the court noted that the
squadron policy established an "envelope" in which the
pilot exercised judgment and discretion. Since the pilot
reached the margins of the envelope, he lost this discre-
tionary role.20 5 The court then held that the government
was negligent per se noting that the pilot was in control of
a high performance aircraft and that unless he used due
care, it was foreseeable that the plane would cause injury
to persons on the ground.2 0 Therefore, the conduct
causing the injury fell within the scope of a Virginia stat-
ute criminalizing the operation of an aircraft without due
caution and in a manner endangering any person or
property.20 7
In Foster v. United States, 208 the court held that the deci-
sion of the Federal Air Surgeon to grant a "special issu-
ance" medical certificate clearly qualified for protection
under the discretionary conduct exception to the
20, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(a) (West 1965 & Supp. 1991).
202 Musick, 768 F. Supp. at 185.
203 931 F.2d 271 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 867 (1992).
204 Musick, 768 F. Supp. at 185.
205 Id. at 187.
206 Id.
207 Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 5.1-13 (Michie 1988)).
200 923 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1991).
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FTCA.2 °9 Consequently, the plaintiff's FTCA claim was
barred.
B. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL
In In re Air Crash at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport,210 the Fifth
Circuit held that the plaintiffs had failed to cite evidence
in support of their contention that two findings of the dis-
trict judge were clearly erroneous.2 1' The plaintiffs
brought suit for death and injuries sustained when Delta
Flight 191 crashed after encountering an unusually strong
wind shear while attempting to land. The plaintiffs first
claimed that the trial judge erred in finding that the air
traffic controllers were not negligent in failing to route
Flight 191 to a different runway. The Fifth Circuit re-
jected this contention as a matter of law. The court noted
that under federal law, the final decision whether to land
rests with the captain of Flight 191, not the controllers.1 2
The plaintiffs also claimed that the trial judge correctly
found that the air traffic controllers were negligent in not
relaying weather information to Flight 191, but erred in
finding that their negligence did not proximately cause
the crash. The Fifth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' request
for de novo review of this issue. The court held that de novo
review was inappropriate because a court's ultimate deter-
mination of proximate cause is a finding of fact and is re-
viewable under the clearly erroneous standard.21 3 The
court affirmed because under Texas law, the evidence
supported the finding that the crew's deliberate decision
to land the airplane, when the airplane easily could have
avoided windshear, was the sole proximate cause of the
crash.21 4
209 Id. at 768.
210 919 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nom., Connors v. United States,
112 S. Ct. 276 (1991).
211 Id. at 1088.
212 Id. at 1084. "The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for,
and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft." F.A.R. 91.3(a).
213 Air Crash at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport, 919 F.2d at 1085.
214 Id. at 1088.
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In Nakajima v. United States,2" 5 the court held that an air
traffic controller was negligent in failing to monitor and
issue traffic advisories warning aircrafts operating in the
area that a Cessna 152 was cleared for a fourth touch and
go landing, despite the fact that the controller had issued
traffic information to the aircraft during the previous
touch and go landing.21 6 Nakajima was training in a Bell
47G helicopter and was holding in a normal pattern. The
Cessna performed a simulated "dead-stick" emergency
landing procedure and descended into the helicopter's
main rotor. The helicopter crashed to the ground, killing
Nakajima; the Cessna landed without injury to its
occupants.
The court held that the controller was negligent in both
failing to advise the two aircraft of each other's position
and in failing to ensure that the respective pilots had each
other in sight.2 1 7 The court also found the controller neg-
ligent in failing to remain vigilant during the 107 second
period between the clearance for the fourth touch and go
and the collision. The controller's failure to properly
scan and observe the airport traffic pattern proximately
caused the controller's failure to issue the safety alerts.
The United States asserted an affirmative defense of
comparative negligence on the ground that Nakajima's
failure to "see and avoid" the Cessna was a contributing
cause of the collision. The court determined Nakajima
30% at fault and the United States 70% at fault. 2 8
In Frutin v. Dryvit Systems, Inc.,29 the court rejected the
government's attempt to avoid liability for ATC negli-
gence because no similar type of liability existed under
applicable state law.22 0 The plaintiff was injured when an
allegedly negligent air traffic controller failed to issue a
travel advisory to a departing plane that collided with his
215 759 F. Supp. 1573 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
216 Id. at 1580-81.
217 Id. at 1579.
218 Id. at 1581.
219 760 F. Supp. 234 (D. Mass. 1991).
220 Id. at 237.
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aircraft. The court rejected the government's assertion
that it could not be held liable since Massachusetts law did
not require a private person to issue a traffic advisory or
an affirmative warning under similar circumstances.2 2'
The court remarked that the United States Supreme
Court had already rejected the argument that the FTCA
imposes no liability for the performance of activities
which private persons do not perform.222 Additionally,
the court rejected the government's assertion that the
proper standard of liability was the good samaritan doc-
trine, instead holding "[n]egligence is the appropriate
standard of liability imposed on private persons and the
United States by Massachusetts law."112
C. MISCELLANEOUS
In Howell v United States,224 the Eleventh Circuit held
that an FAA inspector's failure to ground an airplane
which the inspector knew contained contaminated fuel
was not actionable under Georgia's good samaritan doc-
trine225 because the plaintiffs had not relied on the FAA's
inspection. 2 6 In Howell, the inspector cancelled a sched-
uled check ride after he observed that the plane's fuel was
contaminated. The inspector took no further action and
the aircraft's owners placed the aircraft back in service de-
spite knowledge of the condition. The plane crashed two
days later, killing seventeen people.
The passengers' representatives brought suit under the
FTCA alleging that the inspector should have taken fur-
ther action, and the failure to do so breached a legal duty
to the passengers. The court held that the closest state
221 Id.
222 See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 68 (1955) ("There is
nothing in the Tort Claims Act which shows that Congress intended to draw dis-
tinctions so finespun and capricious as to be almost incapable of being held in the
mind for adequate formulation.")
223 760 F. Supp. at 238.
224 932 F.2d 915 (11 th Cir. 1991).
225 Id. at 918 (Georgia has adopted RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 324A).
226 Howell, 932 F.2d at 919.
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law analogous to plaintiffs' cause of action was Georgia's
good samaritan doctrine which had been applied in Geor-
gia cases to evaluate the liability of private parties for neg-
ligent safety inspection.22 7 However, the court held that
the good samaritan doctrine was not satisfied because the
inspector's conduct did not cause a nonhazardous condi-
tion to become more hazardous, thereby increasing the
risk of harm.2 28 Furthermore, the FAA inspector did not
undertake to perform a duty owed by the airline to its pas-
sengers because "[t]he duties of the FAA supplement
rather than supplant the duties of the airline - duties
which the airline could not, and did not, delegate. 229
The court noted that the plaintiffs might have established
good samaritan liability by proving reliance on the inspec-
tion. However, the court held nothing, including public
knowledge that the FAA periodically inspects planes, es-
tablished that the passengers had actual knowledge of the
unplanned FAA "inspection" two days before their
flight.2 30 Therefore, they could not and did not rely on it.
IV. PREEMPTION
Courts have continued to address the circumstances de-
termining when the Federal Aviation Act (the Act)
preempts state law. In West v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. ,231 for
example, the court held that the Act preempted the plain-
tiff's state law claim for punitive damages.232 The plaintiff
brought a claim for compensatory and punitive damages
for breach of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing
arising from Northwest's refusal to allow the plaintiff to
board an overbooked flight. The court held that while the
plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages was not pre-
227 See, e.g., Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Smith, 322 S.E.2d 269 (Ga.
1984); Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Clark, 267 S.E.2d 797 (Ga. 1980).
228 Howell, 932 F.2d at 919.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 923 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3852) (U.S. June 22,
1992) (No. 91-505)).
232 West, 923 F.2d at 659-60.
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empted by the Act, the claim for punitive damages was.23
The court also noted that federal airline overbooking reg-
ulations specifically contemplate customers choosing be-
tween either liquidated damages or state common law
remedies. 23 4 Therefore, "federal regulations contemplate
overbooking as an acceptable practice so long as passen-
gers receive compensation. Accordingly, any scheme that
punishes the practice would be inconsistent with applicable
federal law. 2 3 5
In Holliday v. Bell Helicopters Textron, Inc. ,236 however, the
court found Hawaii state law crashworthiness claims were
neither impliedly preempted by the Act,237 nor conflicted
with federal regulation.3 8 In Holliday, the plaintiffs
brought a products liability action for injuries incurred
when their helicopter lost power shortly after takeoff and
plunged to the ground. The plaintiffs asserted that the
pilot's seat and seat belt were designed defectively, en-
hancing their injuries and giving rise to a crashworthiness
claim. The defendant first argued that the crashworthi-
ness claim was impliedly preempted by the Act. The court
rejected this argument, reasoning that the defendants
were unable to show that Congress intended to occupy
the specific field of products liability. 239 Furthermore, the
court noted that section 1506 of the Act was a savings
clause 240 which expressly precluded such congressional
intent. 4
The defendant also asserted that federal regulations of
aircraft design, maintenance, and operation were so com-
prehensive that they provided the exclusive standard for
measuring design defects. The defendant argued that the
233 Id. at 661.
234 14 C.F.R. § 250.9(b) (1990).
235 West, 923 F.2d at 661.
236 747 F. Supp. 1396 (D. Haw. 1990).
237 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1542 (1988).
238 Holliday, 747 F. Supp. at 1400.
239 Id.; see West v. Northwest Airlines, 923 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1990).
240 49 U.S.C. app. § 1506 (1988).
24, Holliday, 747 F. Supp. at 1398.
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plaintiffs' claim should be preempted because the defend-
ant had met the minimum Federal Aviation Administra-
tion standards for aircraft seats and safety belts. 42 The
defendant analogized the case to those holdings that the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (MVSA) 243
specifically preempted crashworthiness claims against car
manufacturers for failure to provide an air bag as stan-
dard equipment. The court was unpersuaded, as it noted
that the MVSA contained an explicit preemption
24424clause, whereas the Federal Aviation Act did not.245
Furthermore, unlike the Federal Aviation Act, the MVSA
empowered car manufacturers to choose among various
options.246 The MVSA impliedly preempted state law
claims because such claims would effectively prohibit the
exercise of that federally granted option.247 Because the
Federal Aviation Act did not provide such an option, the
plaintiff's crashworthiness claim was not preempted.
The court also held that the crashworthiness claim was
not preempted by conflict preemption because compli-
ance with both state and federal law was possible.2 4a The
court noted that although the federal law set forth mini-
mum standards, "nothing in the [Federal Aviation Act] in-
dicates that states may not require aircraft to be more safe
or better designed. 2 49 Furthermore, the court held that
"aircraft manufacturers should not be insulated from lia-
bility for a defectively designed product by their compli-
ance with certain minimum standards. 250 Consequently,
the defendants' claims were not preempted.
One court also held that state trucking regulations may
be preempted by federal law. In Federal Express Corp. v.
242 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 27.1413, 27.785, 27.1307, 27.1301, 27.561 (1983).
243 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1988).
244 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1988).
245 Holliday, 747 F. Supp. at 1400.
246 See 15 U.S.C. § 1410b (1988) (manufacturers may choose between manual
seat belts or passive restraints).
247 Holliday, 747 F. Supp. at 1400.




California Public Utilities Commission,251 the Ninth Circuit
held that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978252 pre-
empted state Public Utility Commission (PUC) regula-
tions that affected Federal Express' trucking
operations. 253 Federal Express brought the action seek-
ing to enjoin the California PUC from imposing regula-
tions that governed the imposition, suspension and public
inspection of tariffs of common carriers, and that gov-
erned the bills of lading, freight bills and other docu-
ments issued by the carriers.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court and held
that the PUC was impermissibly acting in an area of eco-
nomic regulation.2 5 ' The court found that "[t]he trucking
operations of Federal Express [were] integral to its opera-
tion as an air carrier. ' 255 The court stated
Federal Express is exactly the kind of an expedited all-
cargo service that Congress specified and the kind of inte-
grated transportation system that was federally desired.
Because it is an integrated system, it is a hybrid, an air
carrier employing trucks. Those trucks do not destroy its
status as an air carrier.256
V. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
A. CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY
In Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. United States,2 57 the court
held that the exclusive remedy of Alaska's Worker's Com-
251 936 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1991), cert.denied, 112 S. Ct. 2956 (1992).
252 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1557 (1988). The Act provides as follows:
Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, no State or
political subdivision thereof ... shall enact or enforce any law, rule,
regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect
of law relating to rates, routes or services of any air carrier having
authority under subchapter IV of this chapter to provide air
transportation.
Id. § 1305(a)(1).
253 Federal Express Corp., 936 F.2d at 1078-79.
254 Id.
255 Id. at 1078.
256 Id. at 1079.
257 755 F. Supp. 269 (D. Alaska 1990).
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pensation Act (AWCA) 258 precluded recognition of a third
party's right to implied contractual or noncontractual in-
demnity against the employer of the injured employee. 59
The suit arose when a helicopter piloted by an officer of
the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Adminis-
tration (NOAA) crashed near Port Hardy, British Colum-
bia. The crash occurred during the pilot's attempt to land
after running out of fuel. A passenger who was a civilian
employee of NOAA and the pilot were both seriously in-
jured. The injured parties settled with the manufacturer
and seller of the helicopter (Bell). Subsequently, Bell
sued the government for indemnity or contribution pur-
suant to the FTCA.
The court noted that Alaska law requires three condi-
tions to be met before a right of non-contractual indem-
nity can be established: (1) the indemnitee (Bell) must
have discharged a legal obligation, such as a tort liability
to a third party; (2) the indemnitor (the government) must
be liable for the same obligation to the third party; and (3)
the obligation ought to be discharged by the indemnitor
rather than the indemnitee.2 60 The court held that the
second prong was not satisfied because the exclusive rem-
edy provision of AWCA precluded a finding that the gov-
ernment was liable in tort.26' Furthermore, the third
prong was not satisfied because Alaska law would hold
that Bell, rather than the government, ought to discharge
Bell's obligation to the injured passenger. 6 2 Therefore,
the court granted the government's motion for summary
judgment. 26 3  The Ninth Circuit recently affirmed the
258 ALAsKA STAT. § 23.30.055 (1990); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Alaska Airlines,
Inc., 343 F. Supp. 826, 828-29 (D. Alaska 1972).
259 755 F. Supp. at 273.
260 Id. at 274; see Industry Risk Insurers v. Creole Prod. Serv., Inc., 568 F. Supp
1323, 1328 (D. Alaska 1983), aff'd, 746 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1984).
261 755 F. Supp. at 274.
262 Id.
263 Id. at 275. The court would have held that the AWCA did not preclude an
action by a third party for indemnity from the employer of an employee injured in
part by the actions of the third party based upon an express contract to indemnify.




In In re Air Crash at Detroit Metropolitan Airport, Detroit,
Michigan on August 16, 1987,265 the court held that the
plaintiffs in a mass tort litigation who had elected not to
become parties to the underlying joint liability trial were
permitted to apply the doctrine of offensive issue preclu-
sion and obtain a finding of liability against the carrier.266
The litigation arose when a McDonnell Douglas Corpora-
tion (MDC) DC-9 aircraft, operated by Northwest Air-
lines, Inc., (Northwest) crashed on take-off when it did not
attain a sufficient altitude to avoid hitting a light pole.
One hundred and fifty-six people died in the accident, in-
cluding passengers and bystanders on the ground below.
The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred
all cases arising out of the crash to the Eastern District of
Michigan for consolidated pretrial proceedings and ulti-
mately the last of the participating plaintiffs accepted
MDC's offer of settlement. Subsequently, a jury found
Northwest liable for the accident and required it to in-
demnify MDC for its losses. Shortly thereafter, the plain-
tiffs who had not participated in the prior proceeding
brought suit and sought to apply the finding of liability to
their respective cases. Northwest objected on the ground
that the plaintiffs were barred from the use of collateral
estoppel.
Northwest cited Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 26 7 for the
proposition that since a federal court sitting in diversity
applies state substantive law to the merits of the action, a
federal diversity judgment is nothing more than a state-
court judgment, the preclusive effect of which should be
determined by state law. 6' Northwest contended that
264 Bell Helicopter-Textron, Inc. v. U.S., No. 91-35324, 91-35338, 1992 WL
127830 (9th Cir. June 15, 1992).
265 776 F. Supp. 316 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
26 Id. at 317.
267 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
26- Air Crash at Detroit Metropolitan Airport, 776 F. Supp. at 320.
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Michigan requires mutuality and, because the plaintiffs
were not parties to the earlier trial, mutuality was lacking.
However, the court held that a mechanical application of
the Erie doctrine was improper and that federal law
should prevail.269
As an initial matter, the court noted that the jury had
also determined issues that were governed by federal
law;2 70 therefore, the defendants' characterization that the
matter involved solely state substantive issues was inaccu-
rate.27' The court then held that the federal law of issue
preclusion was applicable for three policy reasons. First,
a federal court is duty bound to protect its own judgment
regardless of the substantive issues involved. 72 Second,
preclusion concepts may relate to procedural interests of
the court, rather than the substantive law. Third, fairness
and efficiency should permit a court to determine the
scope of its own judgments. In light of these reasons, the
court applied the federal law of issue preclusion to the
matter.
Northwest contended that even under federal law the
United States Supreme Court had explicitly stated in Park-
Lane Hosiery Co. v. Shore273 that offensive issue preclusion
may not be applied in mass tort litigation. However, the
court stated: "A close reading of ParkLane Hosiery reveals
that the Court (1) authorized the use of offensive collat-
eral estoppel, and (2) only mentioned, but did not broadly ac-
cept, the arguments that have been advanced against the wholesale
application of offensive collateral estoppel.' '2 74  The court
agreed that the doctrine should not be applied in situa-
tions where the result would be unfair to the defendant.
However, the court held that "[t]he contours of when of-
269 Id. at 321.
270 Id. ("For example, the issue of willful and wanton misconduct was governed
by the Warsaw Convention.") Id. at 321, n.l 1.
271 Id.
272 Id. (citing CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4472, at 733 (1982)).
273 439 U.S. 322, 330 n.14 (1979).
274 776 F. Supp. at 325.
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fensive collateral estoppel would be unfair - even in
mass tort litigation - should be developed on a case-by-
case basis. Invoking the term 'mass tort litigation' is
meaningless without contextual analysis. '"275
The court then held that application of the doctrine
would not be unfair in the instant case. 76 The court re-
jected Northwest's contention that plaintiffs were "wait
and see" plaintiffs who had benefitted from the efforts of
MDC, but avoided exposure to the risks of an adverse ver-
dict. The court noted that plaintiffs' options in the prior
case were: (1) settling, (2) severing, or (3) stipulating not
to contest liability in exchange for a damages only trial. 77
However, the plaintiffs' options had not included the right
to proceed to trial and judgment against Northwest.
The court also rejected Northwest's contention that it
would be denied procedural opportunities unavailable in
the first action that would cause a different result in a sec-
ond trial. Northwest asserted it could have conducted
more discovery and called different witnesses. However,
the court held that was true of every case and "like life,
litigation must end at some point. ' 278 The court noted
that the first trial had attained monolithic proportions and
that Northwest's claims of lack of discovery and inability
to call witnesses were wholly unfounded.
C. MANDAMUS
In Transportes Aeros Nacionales, S.A. v. Downey, 279 a Texas
court of appeals refused to issue a writ of mandamus di-
recting a judge to withdraw a choice-of-law order because
the moving party failed to demonstrate the judge's order
was a clear abuse of discretion and there was no adequate
remedy by way of appeal.2 8 0 The underlying action in-
275 Id.
276 Id.
277 Id. at 319.
278 Id. at 325.
279 817 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, orig. proceeding
[leave denied]).
280 Id. at 395.
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volved a Continental Airlines airplane, leased to and op-
erated by Transportes Aeros Nacionales, S.A. The
airplane was en route to Miami, Florida, from San Jose,
Costa Rica, and crashed while approaching an intermedi-
ate stop at Tegucigalpa, Honduras. The injured passen-
gers and representatives of the deceased passengers
brought actions under Texas law for negligence, gross
negligence and strict products liability. The trial court
held that Texas law would govern the issues of punitive
damages, negligent inspection or maintenance, and prod-
ucts liability, and the law of Honduras would govern the
issues of negligent operation of the aircraft.
Continental filed a writ of mandamus asserting that the
trial judge abused his discretion in failing to presume that
Honduras law would apply to all issues in the case. Conti-
nental argued that the "most significant relationship" test
mandated application of Honduras law because both the
accident and the conduct causing the accident occurred in
Honduras. However, the court of appeals rejected Conti-
nental's argument because Continental failed to demon-
strate the need for an extraordinary remedy. The court
held that the trial judge's ruling was incidental and that an
adequate remedy existed by way of appeal.2 8' Further-
more, the court held that Continental had also failed to
demonstrate that the judge's order was a clear abuse of
discretion.2 82
D. ARBITRATION
In Vintage Aircraft International, Inc. v. Specialty Restaurants
Corp. ,28s the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Divi-
sion, refused to hold a party in contempt for failing to
comply with the exact terms of an arbitration agreement.
As part of the dissolution of a business venture, Vintage
Aircraft Int'l., Inc. (Vintage) was required to transfer a
two seater Hawker Sea Fury to Specialty Restaurants Cor-
281 Id.
282 Id.
283 576 N.Y.S.2d 296 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
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poration's (Specialty). Vintage appealed the award; how-
ever, during the pendency of Vintage's appeal, the
airplane was destroyed by fire. The order from the court
below was affirmed and Specialty moved to punish Vin-
tage for contempt for its failure to transfer the plane and
for a money judgment for the value of the airplane. The
trial court denied the motion, and Specialty appealed.
The court noted that neither the arbitration award, nor
the order and judgment confirming it, made provision for
the monetary equivalent of the airplane in the event the
airplane was not produced.284 The court held that in or-
der to recover the monetary equivalent or the insurance
proceeds, Specialty was required to file a motion to vacate




In Gross v. American Airlines, Inc. ,286 the court held a com-
mon carrier's duty of care was not so broad as to protect a
passenger injured as a result of attempting to assist a wo-
man who had fallen backwards onto him while they were
waiting in line at American's check-in counter. 28 7 The
court held that the passenger had failed to link his injury
to any conduct on the part of the carrier because he had
not shown what caused the woman to fall. 28 8 Further-
more, the court held that passengers waiting to check-in
had a duty to look for obstacles, such as potentially mis-
placed bags, and to use reasonable care for their own
safety.289 Consequently, the court found that the plaintiff
failed to establish negligence and entered summary judg-
284 Id. at 297.
285 Id.
286 755 F. Supp. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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ment for the defendant. 290
In Jorgensen v. Massachusetts Port Authority,29' the court
held that two airline pilots could not recover for damage
to their reputations when their aircraft crashed due to the
negligence of the Massachusetts Port Authority. 292 Jorgen-
sen arose as a result of the pilots involvement in an acci-
dent when their aircraft skidded off the end of an icy
Logan Airport runway and plunged partially into the Bos-
ton Harbor, killing two people. The accident was alleg-
edly caused by the negligence of the Port Authority in
failing to keep the runway free of ice. The court agreed
that Massachusetts might recognize a claim for negligent
damage to reputation.293 However, the court did not
need to resolve that issue because the plaintiffs failed to
present evidence of specific lost job opportunities. As a
result of that omission, the court held that there was in-
sufficient evidence to support the jury's award of damages
for lost earning capacity stemming from injury to reputa-
tion.294 Similarly, there was insufficient evidence to sup-
port an award for emotional distress resulting from the
alleged loss of earning capacity.295
In Gaines v. Huntsville-Madison County Airport Authority, 296
the Alabama Supreme Court struck down as unconstitu-
tional a statutory provision which accorded larger airport
authorities immunity from all actions in tort but smaller
airport authorities immunity only from negligence. 97
The plaintiff, who slipped and fell on a flight of stairs at
the Huntsville-International Carl T. Jones Airport, sued
the Airport Authority alleging both simple negligence and
wanton negligence. The court dismissed the action be-
290 Id.
291 905 F.2d 515 (1st Cir. 1990).
22 Id. at 521-22.
293 Id.
-: Id. at 526.
295 Id.
296 581 So. 2d 444 (Ala. 1991).
297 Id. at 445.
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cause it found the Authority was immune from suit.298
The plaintiff alleged the statutory immunity provision cre-
ated unconstitutional classifications and asserted that had
he been injured at a smaller airport, he could have recov-
ered for willful negligence of an airport employee;
whereas at a larger airport, he could not. Because no sus-
pect classification was implicated, the court employed the
lowest level of scrutiny to analyze the constitutionality of
the provision.299 Even then, there was no rational basis
for the distinction. Consequently, the court struck the
portion of the act that provided immunity as to torts other
than negligence, and reversed and remanded on the issue
of wantonness.3 0 0
B. FREE SPEECH
In International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.
Lee,3° ' the United States Supreme Court held that an air-
port terminal was a non-public forum and an airport au-
thority could promulgate reasonable regulations
prohibiting the in-person solicitation of funds. 0 2 The In-
ternational Society for Krishna Conciousness, Inc. (ISK-
CON) brought an action seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief setting aside various regulations promul-
gated by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
(Port Authority). The regulations banned both the distri-
bution of literature and in-person soliciation of funds.
ISKCON asserted that the regulations violated the First
Amendment because airport terminals were traditional
public fora for expressive activity. The Court followed a
"forum based" approach for assessing restrictions that
the government sought to place on the use of its prop-
erty. 3  This approach divides government property into
298 Id.
2- Id. at 448.
3-0 id. at 448-49.
-01 60 U.S.L.W. 4749 (U.S. June 26, 1992) (No. 91-155).
302 Id. at 4753.
o10 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
800 (1985).
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three categories: government property that has tradition-
ally been available for public expression, public property
which is designated as a public forum, and all remaining
public property. Government regulations restraining ex-
pressive activity conducted on the last category of prop-
erty need only satisfy a reasonableness standard.0 4
The Court held that airport terminals were neither a
traditional, nor a designated public forum. 3 0 5 Thus, ter-
minals fell in the third category of property and were not
public fora. The Court also held that Port Authority's ban
on solicitation survived the "reasonableness" review be-
cause the solicitation might have a disruptive effect on air-
port business and the solicitor might cause duress by
targeting vulnerable persons or by committing fraud by
concealing his affiliation. 0 6 The Court noted that the
Port Authority could reasonably worry that the incremen-
tal effects of having one group and then another seek such
access could prove quite disruptive even if the inconven-
ience caused by the petitioner might seem
inconsequential.0 7
In the related decision of Lee v. International Society of
Krishna Consciousness, Inc.,308 the Supreme Court held that
the ban on distribution of literature by the Port Authority
was invalid under the First Amendment.3 09 Four of the
five Justices who affirmed the judgment based their deci-
sion on the ground that an airport terminal was a public
forum. The Justices held that the ban failed to satisfy the
requirements of narrow tailoring to further a significant
state interest and availability of ample alternative chan-
nels for communication.3 1 0 Another Justice reached the
conclusion on the ground that an airport terminal was not
a public forum but the ban on distribution of literature
3- Lee, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4751.
305 Id.
s06 Id. at 4752.
307 Id. at 4752-53.




failed to satisfy the reasonableness standard.3 1 ' The four
dissenting Justices remarked that the distribution ban was
as reasonable as the solicitation ban in a non-public forum
and that it should be upheld. 12
C. NUISANCE
In County of Westchester v. Town of Greenwich, Connecticut,313
the court dismissed federal claims by a county of one state
brought against another state, but refused to dismiss the
county's common-law claims. The plaintiff, Westchester
County Airport (WCA), located in New York, desired to
top trees located in adjacent Greenwich, Connecticut,
which encumbered the clear zone of a runway. 4 The fact
that the trees were located in Connecticut led to the litiga-
tion because New York could not exercise its powers of
eminent domain over property located in another state.
The court first held that the plaintiff was a citizen of
New York for Eleventh Amendment purposes.3 5 Conse-
quently, any relief based on Connecticut state law was
barred for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court
also rejected the plaintiff's assertion that it was entitled to
freedom of transit through the navigable airspace of the
United States.3 16 The court held "nothing in the statute
... suggests that Congress meant to create a private right
of action in favor of the owner of an airport. 31 7
However, the court refused to dismiss the plaintiff's
3, Id. at 4761.
312 Id.
313 745 F. Supp. 951 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
314 A clear zone is established by the FAA and requires a specified amount of
unencumbered airspace for airplanes to take off and land. See 14 C.F.R. § 77.25
(1990). The FAA reduced the usable length of Runway 11/29 from approxi-
mately 4,450 feet to 3,100 feet because the neighboring trees reduced the clear
zone.
315 County of Westchester, 745 F. Supp. at 955. The Eleventh Amendment pro-
vides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
316 See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1304 (1982).
317 County of Westchester, 745 F. Supp. at 955.
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claim of common-law nuisance. 3"1 The court held that
whether or not growing trees was a reasonable use of the
property in the particular locality under the circumstances
involved a "balancing of the competing interests of the
parties and ... must ultimately be resolved by the trier of
fact."'3' 9 Furthermore, the court refused to dismiss the
plaintiff's claim that it had acquired a prescriptive ease-
ment in the airspace above the defendant's property. 20
In Oakley v. Simmons,32 l the Tennessee Court of Appeals
reinstated a jury award of punitive damages, despite no
award of compensatory damages, because the trial judge
had awarded injunctive relief.322 In Oakley, the plaintiff
maintained a private airstrip on his property. The de-
fendant neighbor erected a forty foot pole directly in the
path of Oakley's north/south runway. The defendant
stated that the pole would be used as a light pole, but the
pole was located 360 feet from the residence and 400 feet
from the road. The defendant also indicated he intended
to plant two fifty foot trees on either side of the pole. The
plaintiff brought suit alleging the pole was a nuisance. At
trial, a jury awarded the plaintiff $5000 punitive damages
but no compensatory damages. The judge set aside the
award but ordered the neighbor to remove the pole. Both
parties appealed. The court of appeals held that the de-
fendant's pole created a nuisance because it disturbed the
free use of Oakley's property. 23 The court also upheld
the award of punitive damages. The court agreed that ac-
tual damages must be sustained in order to sustain an
award of punitive damages.3 24 The court held, however,
where the plaintiff has proved an entitlement to injunctive
relief, an award of punitive damages may be upheld even
318 Id. at 959.
319 Id.
320 Id.
M2 799 S.W.2d 669 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).
322 Id. at 672.
323 Id. at 671.
324 Id. at 671; see Emerson v. Garner, 732 S.W.2d 613 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).
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without an award of compensatory damages.3 25
D. NoiSE ABATEMENT
In Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for
the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc.,326 the United States
Supreme Court held that an act of Congress authorizing
the transfer of operating control of two major airports
from the federal government to the Metropolitan Wash-
ington Airports Authority (MWAA) violated the constitu-
tional doctrine of separation of powers.327 The transfer
was fueled by a need to raise funds through tax-exempt
instruments for capital improvements. 32  The Transfer
Act 3 29 conditioned the transfer on the MWAA's creation
of a unique Board of Review (Board). The Board was
composed of nine congressional members and was vested
with the power to veto decisions made by MWAA's board
of directors. Essentially, the creation of the Board was in-
tended to insure against the potential for decreases in
traffic from National Airport to Dulles Airport likely to re-
sult from the transfer of control. 330 The MWAA endeav-
ored to overcome the separation-of-powers issue by
requiring the Board members to serve in their individual
capacities as representatives of users of the airports,
rather than as agents of Congress.
Subsequently, MWAA's Board of Directors adopted a
master plan to build a new terminal and increase capacity
at National. Suit was brought by a group of citizens, the
325 Oakley, 799 S.W.2d at 672.
326 111 S. Ct. 2298 (1991).
327 111 S. Ct. at 2312.
328 The Secretary of Transportation concluded that, given the need to limit fed-
eral expenditures, necessary capital improvements could not be financed for
either airport unless control of the airports was transferred to a regional authority
with power to raise money by selling tax-exempt bonds. Id. at 2302; see S. REP.
No. 99-193, p.2 (1985).
329 Metropolitan Washington Airports Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 3341, 49 U.S.C.
app. §§ 2451-2461 (1988) [hereinafter Transfer Act].
130 It was feared that flights to National would be rerouted to Dulles. Since
National was favored by government employees, a decrease in flight availability
would have been inconvenient.
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Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc. (CAAN)
who resided under the flight paths at National. CAAN
sought a declaration that the Board's veto power was un-
constitutional and asked the court to enjoin any actions
taken by MWAA which were subject to a potential veto.
The effect of CAAN's proposed declaration would cripple
the MWAA and prevent the implementation of the Trans-
fer Act.
The Court rejected MWAA's contention that the crea-
tion of the Board did not present a constitutional issue.
The Court held:
We thus confront an entity created at the initiative of Con-
gress, the powers of which Congress has delineated, the
purpose of which is to protect an acknowledged federal
interest, and membership in which is restricted to con-
gressional officials. Such an entity necessarily exercises
sufficient federal power as an agent of Congress to man-
date separation-of-powers scrutiny.33'
The court expressed concern that "Congress could, if this
Board of Review were valid, use similar expedients to en-
able its Members or agents to retain control, outside the
ordinary legislative process, of the activities of state grant
recipients charged with executing virtually every aspect of
national policy. ' 332 Therefore, the Court held the Trans-
fer Act was unconstitutional. s
E. AUTO RENTAL CONCESSIONS
In Epps Aircraft Inc. v. Montgomery Airport Authority,33 4 the
Alabama Supreme Court held that an airport authority
resolution violated the Alabama Constitution because it
impaired the obligation of contracts. 35 In Epps, Exxon
was authorized under the terms of its primary lease to act
as a Fixed Base Operator (FBO) and to provide "[s]uch
331 Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, 111 S. Ct. at 2308.
332 Id. at 2312.
33 Id.
33 570 So. 2d 625 (Ala. 1990).
$35 Id. at 629.
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other services ... and rental of such other items as from
time to time may be handled by FBO's generally. 3 3 6
Epps Aircraft Inc. (Epps) entered into a lease with Exxon
to operate a Thrifty Car Rental business. Exxon's lease
with the airport required Exxon to pay fees of no more
than four percent of gross income. As a sublessee, Epps'
fee schedule was the same as Exxon's. In contrast, Air-
port Authority regulations required that automobile
rental businesses who obtained their concessions directly
from the airport were charged ten percent of gross sales.
Subsequently, the airport approved a resolution which
compelled "non-tenant rental car businesses" (a term
which by definition included Epps' business) to directly
pay the airport ten percent of gross income.
Epps brought suit challenging the constitutionality of
the resolution. The court held automobile rental services
fell within the lease category of "[s]uch other services...
and rental of such other items as from time to time may be
handled by Fixed Base Operators generally. '13 3  To hold
otherwise would be to allow the Airport to avoid its con-
tractual obligations under the primary lease, in violation
of article I, section 22, of the Alabama Constitution. Con-
sequently, the resolution was inapplicable to Epps.
F. LIMOUSINE SERVICES
In Pontarelli Limousine, Inc. v. City of Chicago,3 3 8 the Sev-
enth Circuit held that a state court judgment which had
been vacated was not entitled to have a preclusive effect in
any future litigation. Furthermore, the court held that a
city regulation which prohibited city livery services from
using dispatcher booths at O'Hare Airport, but allowed
suburban services to use them, did not violate equal
protection.3 9
The dispute originated twenty years earlier when the
336 Id. at 626.
337 Id. at 630.
338 929 F.2d 339 (7th Cir. 1991).
3.19 Id. at 341.
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City of Chicago established a livery dispatch system in or-
der to reduce traffic congestion caused by parked cabs
which blocked traffic as the drivers hawked for "walk up"
fares. The dispatch booths were used only for suburban
livery services since the principal demand for "walk up"
passengers was for service to the suburbs rather than the
city. Subsequently, two city-licensed livery services be-
came affiliated with suburban livery services, leading to a
lawsuit in Illinois state court against the City of Chicago
by three city-licensed livery services. The livery services
won, but in exchange for additional consideration, agreed
with the City and the state court to vacate the judgment.
Pontarelli was a duplicative suit brought by ten city-li-
censed livery companies. In Pontarelli, a jury awarded
plaintiffs $400,000 in damages but the district judge en-
tered judgment for defendants notwithstanding the ver-
dict. 40 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the
district court did not err in refusing to give preclusive ef-
fect to the state court litigation.3 41 ' The court held that
Illinois law deprived a vacated judgment of any future ef-
fect.342 Additionally, the court held that there was no de-
nial of equal protection. 43 The court noted that the
regulation could only be struck down if it was irrational
because no suspect classification was implicated. The
court determined that the regulation was rationally re-
lated to alleviating the city's perceived traffic congestion
problem at the airport. Consequently, the district court
did not err in overturning the jury verdict. 344
A similar result was reached in American VI.P. Limousines
Inc. v. Dade County Board of County Commissioners.3 45 A
group of limousine operators brought an action challeng-
ing various regulations governing service to Miami Inter-
national Airport. The district court held that the
340 735 F. Supp. 782, 786 (N.D. Ill. 1990), aff'd, 929 F.2d 339 (7th Cir. 1991).
341 929 F.2d at 340.
342 Id.; see Matchett v. Rose, 649 N.E.2d 770, 779 (Il1. App. 1976).
143 929 F.2d at 341.
344 Id. at 343.
-4 - 757 F. Supp. 1382 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
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classifications neither violated the equal protection rights
of the limousine services nor did the regulations violate
the commerce clause. 46 The court did, however, hold a
pickup fee of ten dollars charged to limousine services
was discriminatory in view of the fact that taxicabs were
only required to pay one dollar.3 4 7
VII. WARSAW CONVENTION AND AIR CARRIER
LIABILITY
A. WARSAW JURISDICTION
In Alvarez v. Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. ,348 the
court held that the Warsaw Convention 349 did not create
an exclusive cause of action and therefore did not author-
ize an action brought solely under state law to be removed
to federal court.3 5 0 In Alvarez, the plaintiff's decedents
died in the crash of Avianca Flight 52 while approaching
Kennedy Airport, New York, en route from Medellin, Co-
lombia. The plaintiff filed her complaint in Florida state
court. The defendants asserted that the Warsaw Conven-
tion created an exclusive federal cause of action, however,
and thus removal to federal court was proper. The court
rejected the defendant's assertion and held that the Con-
vention does not create an exclusive cause of action. The
court did agree, however, that the Convention creates an
exclusive remedy which limits the liability that can be im-
posed on carriers for claims brought under state law.35 '
Consequently, because the plaintiffs grounded the action
solely in Florida wrongful death law and did not invoke
any federal law or statute as a basis for her claim, the
court remanded the action for further proceedings in the
346 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
347 Dade County Board, 757 F. Supp. at 1399.
348 756 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
s9 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No.
876 (1934), (reprintedfollowing 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1988) [hereinafter Warsaw
Convention].
350 756 F. Supp. at 555.
35l Id.
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state court.352
In In re Air Crash Disaster Near Warsaw, Poland,151 the
court held that for purposes of determining whether War-
saw jurisdiction was proper "the ultimate destination of
the passenger is the place where the passenger intended
to end up and would have ended up but for the acci-
dent". 54 Litigation arose from an airline crash in which
the plaintiff's decedents were killed. The defendant
LOT, the Polish national airline, asserted that because the
ultimate destination on the plaintiff's decedent's round
trip ticket was Warsaw, the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw
Convention. The plaintiffs asserted their decedents had
intended to remain in the United States and redeem the
unused portion of their tickets. The plaintiffs further
maintained that their decedents had only purchased
round trip tickets because they believed that Polish law
requiring the purchase of round trip tickets applied to
them, despite having United States permanent residency
status.
The court noted other decisions in which the "ultimate
destination" has been determined either by looking at the
destination listed on the contract, 55 or the place where
the mutual intentions of the parties determine the ulti-
mate destination was if other than that listed on the con-
tract.356 The court rejected both alternatives. The court
held that "[t]he intention of the passenger alone, and not
the mutual intention of the parties as expressed in the
contract or otherwise, determines the passenger's 'ulti-
mate destination'.... [T]here should be a presumption
3' id. at 556.
35- 760 F. Supp. 30 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
354 Id. at 32.
155 See Gayda v. LOT Polish Airlines, 702 F.2d 424, 425 (2d Cir. 1983) ("it is the
'ultimate' destination listed in the contract that controls").
356 See In re Air Crash Disaster at Malaga, Spain, 577 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) (Gayda does not preclude either the passenger or the carrier from showing
that certain terms in the purported contract arose from a mutual mistake).
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that the ticket indicates that destination. ' 57  Conse-
quently, LOT's motion was denied with the provision that
it could renew the motion after taking discovery concern-
ing the decedents' intentions.
B. INJURIES WITHIN SCOPE OF CONVENTION
In Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd,ss8 the United States
Supreme Court interpreted Article 17 of the Warsaw Con-
vention to exclude recovery for purely mental injuries. 59
In Floyd, an international flight originating in Miami ex-
perienced rapid loss of altitude resulting from the failure
of all three of the aircraft's engines. After descending
without power for a brief period the crew managed to
restart one engine and the plane returned safely to Miami.
A group of passengers, whose complaints were consoli-
dated for trial, brought an action against Eastern claiming
damages solely for mental distress arising out of the inci-
dent. Reversing the decision of the court of appeals and
affirming the district court, the Supreme Court held that
the term "bodily injury" excludes recovery for purely
mental injuries.3 6 0 The court held: 1) the contemporary
plain meaning of "lesion corporelle" excludes non-physi-
cal injuries; 2) neither French legislative history nor deci-
sional law indicates that, at the time the Warsaw
Convention was drafted, the term "lesion corporelle" in-
cluded non-physical injuries; 3) the minutes of the draft-
ers' committee meetings provided no evidence that the
drafters contemplated the existence of a psychic injury
unaccompanied by a physical injury; 4) protocols appear-
ing to expand the meaning of "lesion corporelle" were
not supported by discussions that would incorporate
solely non-physical injuries; and 5) to follow the single sis-
ter signatory that expanded the term to include solely
157 Air Crash Disaster near Warsaw, Poland, 760 F. Supp. at 32.
358 111 S. Ct. 1489 (1991) (prior decision at 872 F.2d 1462 (11 th Cir. 1989), on
remand to 937 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir. 1991).
359 Floyd, 111 S. Ct. at 1497.
3- Id. at 1498.
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psychic injuries could subject international air carriers to
strict liability for purely mental distress.3 6'
In contrast, the New York court in In re Inflight Explosion
on Trans World Airlines, Inc. Aircraft Approaching Athens, Greece
on April 2, 1986,362 found damages for pain and extreme
psychic suffering were awardable under the Warsaw Con-
vention.36 3 A known terrorist had boarded Flight 840 in
Cairo and had placed a bomb under her own seat. After
setting the bomb trigger and deplaning in Rome, she pro-
ceeded to a self-congratulatory television appearance in
Lebanon. As Flight 840 approached Athens Airport, the
bomb exploded, killing four passengers and injuring
others. Alberto Ospina, seated above the bomb, was
blown out of the plane; his broken body was later found
with serious wounds in the lower torso. A jury found
TWA's failure to maintain adequate security measures
constituted willful conduct and awarded Mr. Ospina's
widow $2,754,951.60 in damages. TWA asserted that the
Convention did not cover survival damages and argued
that the court had erred in permitting an included award
of $85,000 for Mr. Ospina's pain and suffering for being
blown out of the plane and falling to the ground.
The court held that federal common law, not state law,
resolved the issue of the Convention's coverage of dam-
ages in a survival action.3 4 To fashion a uniform modern
federal common law rule for Warsaw Convention recov-
eries, the court looked to the policies underlying survival
actions, to state law decisions addressing the issue, and to
analogous federal statutes. The court noted survival ac-
tions are designed to ensure that a tortfeasor will not fare
better in court by killing than by injuring, due to the ter-
mination of subsequent damages for pain and suffering.
361 Id. at 1493-94.
362 778 F. Supp. 625 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
363 Id.
I3 d. at 640-41; see In re Aircrash at Lockerbie, Scotland on Dec. 21, 1988, 928
F.2d 1267, 1274 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, Rein v. Pan Am World Airways, 112 S. Ct.
331 (1991) (holding the Warsaw Convention preempts state law causes of action
and applying federal common law to determine substantive issues).
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The court was particularly persuaded that damages were
appropriate because of a person's inviolate right against
impairment of his or her freedom.3 65 The court also
noted that the majority of states have either survival stat-
utes or provide for survival recovery under wrongful
death statutes.3 66 Furthermore, the court noted that sev-
eral federal statutes provide for survival recovery, includ-
ing damages for pain and suffering. 367 Consequently, the
court held that the damages included survival recovery for
the purpose of the Convention.3 6 Therefore, the court
affirmed the award.
In Padilla v. Olympic Airways, 69 the court held that an air-
line was not liable under the terms of the Convention for
a passenger's injuries where the passenger had deliber-
ately consumed between seven and nine beers prior to
collapsing in the airplane lavatory.3 70 The court main-
tained that the plaintiff had not proven that he was injured
as the result of an "accident" within the meaning of Arti-
cle 17. The plaintiff had failed to prove that the contin-
ued service of alcohol to him during the flight was an
unusual or unexpected event because there was no evi-
dence that the airline was aware of his alleged
intoxication.3
C. CARGO AND PASSENGER BAGGAGE
In Victoria Sales Corp. v. Emery Air Freight, Inc. ,372 the Sec-
ond Circuit held that article 18, section 3, of the Warsaw
Convention did not apply to the loss of cargo which had
been successfully transported to an air freight forwarder's
warehouse located outside the boundaries of the airport,
365 778 F. Supp. at 631.
366 Id.
367 Id. at 632-36.
368 Id.
369 765 F. Supp. 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
370 Id. at 838.
371 Id. at 837 (citing Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405-06 (1985) (liability
arises under Warsaw Convention only if injury is caused by an unexpected or unu-
sual event or happening that is external to passenger)).
372 917 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1990).
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and then lost once in its possession.3 73 Emery contended
that a practical interpretation of "transportation by air"
would extend coverage to include the storage of cargo at
a place outside the airport, until the time when the goods
were picked up by the consignee pursuant to the carriage
contract. Emery also suggested that its warehouse should
be deemed to be functionally part of the airport. The trial
court agreed with Emery and assessed damages according
to the limitations of the Convention.
On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected Emery's posi-
tion. The court held "as the plain language of Article 18
directs, 'transportation by air' would include a loss occur-
ring while the cargo was in the air or on the ground but
within the confines of the airport's boundaries". Con-
sequently, the case was reversed and remanded for a new
trial.
In Onyeanusi v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. ,375 the
Third Circuit held that human remains shipped via an in-
ternational air carrier qualified as "goods" subject to the
Warsaw Convention 6.3 7  The plaintiff had made arrange-
ments with Pan American World Airways, Inc. (Pan Am)
to ship his mother's remains from New York to Port Har-
court, Nigeria. The remains were delayed and when fi-
nally arrived were damaged and decomposed. The
plaintiff gave written notice of the claim two months after
receipt of the remains; however, Pan Am rejected the
claim as untimely.
Under the Warsaw Convention, damage of goods must
-73 Article 18, § 3 provides in pertinent part:
The period of the transportation by air shall not extend to any trans-
portation by land, by sea or by river performed outside an airport.
If, however, such transportation takes place in the performance of a
contract for transportation by air, for the purpose of loading, deliv-
ery or transshipment, any damage is presumed, subject to proof to
the contrary, to have been the result of an event which took place
during the transportation by air.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 349, art. 18, § 3.
374 Victoria Sales Corp., 917 F.2d at 707.
375 952 F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 1992).
376 Id.
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be reported within seven days of receipt, and delayed de-
livery of baggage and goods must be reported in writing
within fourteen days of receipt. 377 Failure to comply with
the timing requirements precludes an action against the
carrier, save actions for fraud. 378 The plaintiff asserted
that human remains were neither baggage nor goods and
therefore the Convention's timing rules were inapplica-
ble. The court disagreed. The court noted "goods" was a
translation of the French word "marchandises" which had
been interpreted as "anything able to be the object of a
commercial transaction. '379 The court observed that
there was in fact a market for human tissue and organs
and other parts of the human body; thus human remains
fit within the definition of "goods. 3 8 0 The court also
held that a policy of limiting the potential liability of air
carriers would be frustrated by excluding "goods" whose
commercial values were difficult to determine.3 ' Such a
construction "would exempt a significant number of
claims from the Convention, thus exposing air carriers to
inestimable liability. "382
The court further rejected the plaintiff's assertion that
Pan Am's willful misconduct avoided the notice require-
ments of the Convention. The court held such miscon-
duct would only excuse the Convention's limitations on
monetary liability, not the requirements of notice. 3  Be-
cause the plaintiff had failed to give timely notice of the
damage to his mother's corpse as a prerequisite for main-
taining an action, Pan Am's motion for summary judg-
ment was properly granted.
311 Warsaw Convention, supra note 349, art. 26(s)(3).
378 Id. art. 26(4).
7.9 Onyeanusi, 952 F.2d at 791 (citation omitted).
380 Id. at 792.
I d. at 793.
382 Id.
383 Id. at 794.
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D. DISCRIMINATION
In Shinault v. American Airlines, Inc. ,384 the court held that
emotional distress damages were available to a private
plaintiff who sued under the Air Carrier Access Act of
1986 (ACAA).385 Under the particular circumstances of
the case neither injunctive relief, nor recovery of punitive
damages, were appropriate. 86 The case arose when
Shinault, a thirty-year-old quadriplegic, was denied per-
mission to deplane first, along with other passengers who
were in danger of missing their connecting flights.
Shinault was forced to deplane last. Shinault's connecting
flight was also delayed. Once Shinault arrived at the con-
necting gate, he was denied boarding even though the air-
plane had not yet left the gate and the jetway was still
open. As a result, Shinault waited five hours before catch-
ing the next direct flight. Shinault sued American under
the ACAA alleging American discriminated against him
by not allowing him to board his connecting flight be-
cause he was handicapped. Shinault sought injunctive re-
lief, compensatory damages, emotional distress damages,
and punitive damages. The district court granted Ameri-
can's motion for summary judgment.
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court. As an ini-
tial matter, the court rejected American's motion to affirm
on the alternative ground that Shinault had presented no
evidence of discrimination. The court held that a jury
could conclude that, but for Shinault's handicap and the
additional time required to get him aboard the airplane,
American would have allowed him to board the flight.387
The court also rejected American's assertion that pri-
vate remedies under the ACAA should be the same as pri-
vate remedies under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
384 936 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1991).
38, Id. (citing Pub. L. 99-435, 100 Stat. 1080 (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C.A. app. § 1374(c) (Supp. 1991)).
386 Shinault, 936 F.2d at 805.
387 Id. at 800.
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of 1973.388 Instead, the court held that the ACAA allowed
a private plaintiff to recover all necessary and appropriate
remedies to place him in as near as the same position as
possible that he would have occupied if the wrong had not
been committed. 8 9 Therefore, the court held that the
ACAA allowed recovery of compensatory damages and
emotional distress damages.3 9 0 However, the court held
that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction g3 9  precluded a
finding that the ACAA provided injunctive relief to
Shinault. The court deterined Shinault's interest was in-
sufficient to exceed that of the Department of Transporta-
tion392 because it was unlikely that Shinault would
encounter the same set of circumstances again. The court
also declined to determine whether punitive damages
were available under the ACAA because Shinault had not
alleged the type of wanton and malicious conduct neces-
sary to recover punitive damages.
E. MISCELLANEOUS
In 0'Toole v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. , an airline agent
told a plaintiff to run as fast as she could to catch a con-
necting flight. Subsequently, the plaintiff claimed breath-
ing-related injuries resulting from having to run the
length of twenty-three gates. The court granted defend-
ant's motion for summary judgment and held that
"[a]bsent any indication that the passenger is ailing, the
community standard clearly does not view running as a
388 Id. at 803-04; see Pub. L. 93-112, 87 Stat. 335 (codified as amended 29
U.S.C.A. § 794(a) (Supp. 1991) (the Act permits injunctive relief and declaratory
relief, as well as monetary awards in the form of back pay).
389 Shinault, 936 F.2d at 804.
390 Id.
9 1 When legal disputes develop that directly affect an industry subject to regu-
lation, the need arises to integrate the regulatory agency into the judicial decision
making process. One way to accomplish this is to have an agency pass in the first
instance on those issues that are within its competence. Id. (quoting Mississippi
Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line, 532 F.2d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 1976), cert
denied, 429 U.S. 1094 (1977)).
192 The DOT later promulgated regulations addressing the problems encoun-
tered in Shinault. See 14 C.F.R. § 382 (1991).
393 No. CIV.A.89-1704-S, 1990 WL 198422 (D. Mass. Nov. 16, 1990).
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risk to healthful breathing. '3 94
In In re Air Crash at Detroit Metropolitan Airport, Detroit,
Michigan on August 16, 1987,395 the court held that an in-
terstate carrier can relieve itself from liability on its travel
passes for ordinary negligence. 96 Any conduct which is
beyond ordinary negligence cannot be contractually re-
leased from liability, however, regardless of whether it is
characterized as gross negligence, wanton or willful mis-
conduct or willful and wanton negligence. 97
VIII. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
A. STATUTES OF REPOSE
In Carr v. Beech Aircraft Corp. ,39a the court determined
that Arizona's statute of repose was constitutional and
thus precluded the plaintiffs' product liability action.3 99
Can- arose out of death and injuries incurred on October
2, 1988, when a 1969 Beech aircraft burst into flames af-
ter landing short of the runway at Scottsdale, Arizona.
The plaintiffs filed product liability actions against Beech,
the aircraft manufacturer. Beech moved for summary
judgment claiming that Arizona's 12-year statute of re-
pose 40 0 for product liability actions had expired. The
plaintiffs contended that the statute was unconstitutional
and unenforceable. The court held that the plaintiffs'
claims were foreclosed because they had specifically been
rejected by the Arizona Supreme Court.40 The court also
held that the statute of repose did not violate the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because
it was rationally related to the state legislature's purpose
3- Id. at *2.
395 756 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
3- Id. at 324.
397 Id. at 326.
s98 758 F. Supp. 1330 (D. Ariz. 1991).
3- Id. at 1332.
4- ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-551 (1992).
401 See Bryant v. Continental Conveyor & Equip. Co., 751 P.2d 509, 513 (Ariz.
1988) (holding Arizona statute valid under the Arizona Constitution).
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of controlling a perceived tort liability crisis.4 °2 Addition-
ally, the court held that the statute did not deprive the
plaintiffs of a fundamental property right by precluding a
strict liability in tort action before the claim even ac-
crued.4 °3 The court held that "[d]ue process is not impli-
cated by such statutes because there is no tort cause of
action, and therefore no vested property right upon which
to base a Fourteenth Amendment due process challenge,
until an injury actually occurs. '40 4
B. TOLLING
In Palmer v. Borg- Warner Corp. ,405 the court held that the
period of limitations for a products liability suit, as a mat-
ter of law, commences upon notification of an airline
crash.40 6 In Palmer, the plaintiff brought a wrongful death
action arising from an airplane crash. Two years and nine
days after the plaintiff became aware of the crash, the
plaintiff filed a products liability suit alleging that a defec-
tive carburetor had caused the crash. The defendant
moved to dismiss the case because the two-year period of
limitations had expired. The court interpreting its hold-
ing in Mine Safety Appliances v. Stiles,40 7 held that "[u]pon
notification of an airplane crash, a reasonable person has,
as a matter of law, enough information to be alerted that
she 'should begin an inquiry' concerning a potential cause
of action against the pilot, the carrier or the manufac-
turer. ' 40 8 The court rejected arguments that the plaintiff
did not know of and could not have known of the defec-
tive carburetor until a later date. The court held "[i]f in-
quiry, diligently pursued, would have revealed sufficient
information to justify filing within the two-year limitations
period, we see no basis for equitably tolling the statutory
402 Carr, 758 F. Supp. at 1334.
403 Id. at 1334-35.
404 Id. at 1334 (citations omitted).
405 818 P.2d 632 (Alaska 1990).
4- Id. at 634.
407 756 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1988).
408 Palmer, 818 P.2d at 634.
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time limitation. 40 9
A strongly worded dissent noted that under the major-
ity formulation, "in order to act reasonably a claimant
must begin an immediate investigation of all possible
causes of an accident, no matter how far-fetched, compar-
atively unlikely, or well-concealed they may be."'41 0 The
dissent argued that formulation had been implicitly re-
jected in Hanebuth v. Bell Helicopter Int'l.4 '
IX. DAMAGES
A. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
In In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21,
1988,412 the Second Circuit, applying federal common
law, held that punitive damages were not recoverable in
actions governed by the Warsaw Convention. 4 3 The
court reviewed the Convention's purposes, structure, and
history and explored the role of punitive damages in
American law generally. In light of its analysis, the court
held that "the Convention preempts state causes of action
because differences in the various state law - some of
which view punitive damages as penal in nature, some
compensatory, and some both - would introduce such
great confusion into the subject as to destroy any hope of
uniformity in applying the Convention.9 414
The court next held that because air carrier liability is a
uniquely international problem requiring uniform inter-
pretation, the Convention must be interpreted according
to federal common law.41 5 The court adopted the federal
common law of torts and determined that federal com-
mon law did not contemplate a compensatory element in
409 Id.
410 Id. at 638 (Compton, J., dissenting).
4, 694 P.2d 143, 146 (Alaska 1984).
412 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, Rein v. Pan Am World Airways,
Inc., 112 S. Ct. 331 (1991).
41 Id. at 1269-70.
414 Id. at 1270.
415 Id. at 1278.
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a punitive damages claim.41 6 It remained, therefore, to
determine whether the Convention permitted punishment
of a defendant and deterrence of certain kinds of conduct
by allowing punitive damages. The court held no intent
existed because: (1) Article 17 referred to "actual harm
caused by an accident rather than generalized legal dam-
ages; ' '4 17 (2) it was highly unlikely that Article 24(2) 4 18 was
intended by its drafters to preserve a common law right to
punitive damages; and (3) the "unlimited liability for will-
ful misconduct" provision of Article 25 was meant only to
refer to unlimited liability for compensatory damages.4 9
Furthermore, the court held that allowing recovery of
punitive damages would undermine the policy considera-
tions underlying the Convention. 420 First, the goal of es-
tablishing a uniform carrier liability regime would be
defeated because no other country had awarded punitive
damages under the Convention. Second, the goal of mak-
ing airlines insurable would be defeated because if an air-
line could not find an insurer willing to sell insurance for
punitive damages, it might choose to terminate interna-
tional flights rather than risk bankruptcy with every flight.
Third, the availability of punitive damages would defeat
the goal of compensating plaintiffs quickly with a mini-
mum of litigation because every plaintiff would claim will-
ful misconduct.
Similarly, in In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1,
416 Id. at 1280.
417 Id. at 1281.
4 Article 24 provides:
(1) In the cases covered by articles 18 and 19 [baggage claims] any
action for damages, however founded, can only be brought subject
to the conditions and limits set out in this convention.
(2) In the cases covered by article 17 the provisions of the preceding
paragraph shall also apply, without prejudice to the questions as to
who are the persons who have the right to bring suit and what are
their respective rights.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 349, art. 24.
1"9 Warsaw Convention, supra note 349, art. 17.
420 Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, 928 F.2d at 1280.
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1983,421 the District of Columbia Circuit interpreted Arti-
cle 17 of the Warsaw Convention to exclude recovery for
punitive damages.4 22 The litigation arose out of a crash
when a Boeing 747 airliner was shot down over the Sea of
Japan by one of the Soviet Union's SU- 15 interceptor air-
craft, killing all 269 persons on board. Ajury awarded the
plaintiffs both actual and punitive damages. On appeal,
the court vacated the $50 million punitive damages
award. 423 The court held that the language "liable for
damage sustained" strongly implies that the carrier's re-
sponsibility is compensatory and extends only to the repa-
ration of loss from the death or injury of passengers.424
The court held that "damage sustained" referred to actual
harm, not legal damages.425 Additionally, the require-
ment that the damage sustained resulted from an accident
aboard the aircraft reinforced the conclusion that recov-
ery was available only for actual loss since an accident can-
not cause punitive damages.426
In Hospital Authority of Gwinnett County v. Jones,427 on re-
mand from the United States Supreme Court, the
Supreme Court of Georgia reconsidered and reinstated
its previous judgment that an award of nominal damages
of $5,001 and punitive damages of $1.3 million was not
unconstitutionally excessive. 28 O'Kelley, the plaintiff's
decedent, was severely burned in an automobile accident
and taken by ambulance to a nearby hospital. Shortly
thereafter, in accordance with hospital policy, O'Kelley
was airlifted by helicopter to a hospital with a burn unit.
Enroute, the helicopter crashed. O'Kelley was slightly in-
42. 932 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, Dooley v. Korean Airlines Ltd.,
112 S. Ct. 616 (1991).
42 Id. at 1484-85.
423 Id. at 1491.
424 Id. at 1485 (quoting Warsaw Convention, supra note 349, art. 17).
425 Id.
426 Id. at 1486.
427 Hospital Auth. of Gwinnett County, Georgia v. Jones, 409 S.E.2d 501 (Ga.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1175 (1992) [hereinafter Hospital II].
428 Id. at 502.
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jured in the crash but died several days later as a result of
his original burn injuries.
In its first consideration of the case, the Georgia
Supreme Court approved the jury award.429 The court
found that there need be no relationship between the in-
jury and the amount of punitive damages under Georgia
law, the sole exception to this being damages awarded for
wounded feelings. 430 The court observed that the Hospi-
tal Authority's policy of bypassing continued care at a
nearby non-participating hospital and diverting patients
to the Hospital Authority's own hospitals "supports a
jury's finding of wanton disregard for the rights, and a
conscious indifference to the best interest, of its injured
patients."4 3 '
The United States Supreme Court granted the Hospital
Authority's writ of certiorari, then vacated the judgment
and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Pa-
cific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip.432 On remand, the Geor-
gia Supreme Court noted that
[w]hile the Supreme Court in Haslip analyzed the punitive
damages award by comparing it to the actual award, noth-
ing in the opinion mandates such a comparison. In fact,
the Court approved the Alabama review standards which
include 'whether there is a reasonable relationship between
the punitive damages award and the harm likely to result
from the defendant's conduct as well as the harm that ac-
tually has occurred.' 43 3
The court held the award was not excessive because the
actual harm to O'Kelley was slight, but the potential harm
to patients in other circumstances supported the punitive
429 Hospital Auth. of Gwinnett County v. Jones, 386 S.E.2d 120 (Ga. 1989), cert.
granted and judgment vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1298 (1991) [hereinafter Hospital I]. The
court held the award of nominal damages was supported because O'Kelley would
not have received the additional slight injuries but for the unwarranted transpor-
tation. Id. at 123.
430 Id.
431 Id. at 122.
432 Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991).
4, Hospital I1, 409 S.E.2d at 503.
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damages award.434 The court stated:
Surely the process is not rendered unconstitutional by
permitting the deterrence of potentially dangerous con-
duct at a point in time when the injury is slight and when
only nominal damages may be involved. Society's interest
would seem better served by deterring objectionable con-
duct at the first opportunity so that the potentially greater
injury which might otherwise be caused by such conduct
might be avoided.435
B. BURDEN OF PROOF
In Faria v. M/V Louise,43 6 the Ninth Circuit held the in-
demnitee bears the burden of apportioning damages in an
indemnity case where the underlying settlements covered
multiple accidents, only some of which involved claims
against the indemnitor 3 7 The underlying action in-
volved claims by two employees against their employer,
Louise V, for injuries arising out of two accidents involv-
ing McDonnell-Douglas helicopters and two accidents
having no connection with McDonnell Douglas Helicop-
ter Company (MDHC) .438 The employer paid the em-
ployees lump sums of $60,000 and $112,500 respectively
in good faith settlement of their claims. The settlement
agreement did not apportion the amounts among the ac-
cidents nor was apportionment discussed at the settle-
ment hearing. Subsequently, the employer sued MDHC
for indemnity and demanded reimbursement of the entire
settlement to the first employee and $87,500 out of the
second settlement. The district court found for the em-
ployer and awarded reimbursement as requested, plus
costs and fees and denied MDHC's motion to dismiss.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed. The court re-
jected the employer's contention that once it had submit-
434 Id.
435 Id.
436 945 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1991).
437 Id. at 1143.
438 MDHC is the successor in interest to Hughes Helicopters, Inc. a subsidiary
of McDonnell-Douglas Corp.
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ted the settlement figures and proven the amounts were
paid, it was incumbent upon the indemnitor to introduce
evidence that the representation of damages was inaccu-
rate or inappropriate. The court noted that a good faith
settlement might create a rebuttable presumption as to
the facts upon which the settlement was based.4 9 How-
ever, a good faith settlement did not create a presumption
that damages had been apportioned among claims where
no such apportionment was made in connection with the
settlement. 440 Because the employer had failed to point
to any evidence before the district judge to support an ap-
portionment of damages, the Ninth Circuit reversed and
entered judgment for MDHC.44 t
C. PECUNIARY DAMAGES
In Das v. RoyalJordanian Airlines,'"2 the court held that a
travel agent was liable for consequential damages which
resulted when it issued confirmed tickets to a passenger
who was in fact on a wait list.44 3 Bengal, the travel agency,
confirmed Das for a flight to Calcutta, India; however, the
flight was subsequently cancelled by Royal Jordanian.
When Royal Jordanian reinstated the flight, Bengal ob-
tained a new reservation for Das as a wait-listed passen-
ger. When Das complained about his status, Bengal
issued tickets showing confirmed space. The details on
the tickets were handwritten, not computer-generated.
When Das arrived at the airport, Royal Jordanian refused
to honor the tickets. Bengal asserted that holders of con-
firmed tickets on the original flight should be entitled to
the same status on the reinstated flight. The court re-
jected that contention because the obligation did not exist
in the aviation industry.4 '" The court held that Bengal
439 Faria, 945 F.2d at 1143-44; see H.S. Equities v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co., 661 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1981).
440 Faria, 945 F.2d at 1144.
441 Id. at 1145.
442 766 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
443 Id. at 171.
444 Id. at 170.
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was Das' agent and as such owed a duty of due care to
Das.445 Consequently, Das was entitled to recover the
cost of the tickets, the costs incurred due to being delayed
an additional day, and $1,000 for the emotional distress
Bengal inflicted on Das by its actions.44
In Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Ageloff,447 the Florida Supreme
Court held the term "net accumulations" under the Flor-
ida Wrongful Death Act 448 excluded investment income,
but included the investment return on future savings.449
Ageloff, who had died in an airline crash, was unmarried
and had no dependents. Ageloff's experts testified that
Ageloff would have continued to reinvest 25% of his
gross earnings into his family's toy business. They testi-
fied that the present value of the loss of prospective net
accumulations to Ageloff's estate was between two and
three million dollars. Delta contended that the invest-
ment yield on future savings constituted "income from in-
vestments continuing beyond death" and was therefore
excluded from the definition of "net accumulations". The
court held "net accumulations" included the investment
income on the future savings and affirmed.450
D. COSTS AND FEES
In Galowich v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,451 the court held a
deposition which was used at trial to impeach or refresh
the recollection of a witness was not "necessary" for the
purpose of awarding costs to the losing litigant.452 The
court remarked that "[i]f a witness admits making a con-
tradictory statement during a deposition, we fail to see
why it is necessary to use the deposition at trial. Likewise,
445 Id. at 171.
446 Id.
447 552 So.2d 1089 (Fla. 1989).
448 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.16-.27 (West 1991).
449 Ageloff, 552 So.2d at 1092.
4- Id. at 1089.
45, 441 N.E.2d 318 (Ill. 1982).
452 Id. at 322 ("the test for when the expense of a deposition is taxable as costs
is its necessary use at trial").
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we do not believe that any attempt to refresh recollection,
no matter how minor the issue, is a necessary use.14 5 -
X. INSURANCE COVERAGE
A. PILOT QUALIFICATIONS
In United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Cash Air,
Inc.,4 USAU sought a declaration that coverage was not
available for injuries or damages caused by a crash of its
insureds' Piper Seneca. It was uncontested that the pilot,
Covich, did not have the experience as a pilot that was
required in the pilot experience warranty of the policies.
Following the majority view, the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts held "the USAU policy requirements
concerning pilot experience were intended to be condi-
tions precedent to the existence of coverage. '45 5 Simi-
larly, the court held that, even when the loss was not
caused by a breach of that policy condition, an insurer is
entitled to rely on a policy provision that unambiguously
makes coverage dependent on the pilot of the aircraft
meeting particular experience standards.4 56
Consequently, the court held "the explicit condition
precedent of pilot experience serves a worthwhile pur-
pose, and it is irrelevant whether the breach caused the
loss for which a claim is made under the policy. 457
B. CONTRACT LANGUAGE
1. Ambiguous Terms
In National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v.
Hudson Energy Co.,458 the Supreme Court of Texas con-
strued an insurance policy not to exclude coverage for si-
multaneous piloting of an aircraft by a qualified and an
453 Id.
- 568 N.E.2d 1150 (Mass. 1991).
455 Id. at 1152.
456 Id.
457 Id.
458 811 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. 1991).
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unqualified pilot.45 9 Hudson, the insured, purchased a
Cessna P-210 with dual controls. During a lesson with his
instructor, the air traffic controller instructed Hudson to
land on a runway that required him to make a steep de-
scent. As the airplane was landing, it began to bounce
and the instructor assisted Hudson by operating the sec-
ond set of instruments. Inexplicably, the Cessna veered
off the runway into the sod and flipped over when its nose
gear sheared off.
Hudson filed a claim under his insurance policy to re-
cover for damage to the plane. The insurance policy re-
quired that when in flight, the aircraft was to be piloted
either by Hudson, provided he was a "private pilot," 460 or
by any "private or commercial pilot."146' The jury found
that although Hudson was not qualified because he was
only a student pilot, the instructor was qualified. National
Union asserted that denial of coverage was proper be-
cause the policy excluded coverage when an unqualified
pilot was at the controls, even if a qualified pilot was si-
multaneously piloting the aircraft. Conversely, Hudson
asserted that the policy merely required that a qualified
pilot be at the controls, and that it did not matter if an
unqualified pilot was also at the controls.
The court held that the policy was ambiguous because it
did not expressly address the situation in which the air-
craft was piloted by a qualified pilot and by a pilot other
than a qualified pilot.462 Under Texas law, an ambiguous
insurance policy is construed according to any reasonable
interpretation of the contract terms advanced by the in-
459 Id. at 554-55.
4- Id. at 554. Hudson's "private pilot" status required that he was properly
certified by the FAA, having had a minimum of 213 logged flying hours and hav-
ing received 15 hours of dual instruction from a properly certified pilot prior to
solo. Id.
461 Id. To qualify for this status, the pilot was to be instrument rated with a
minimum of 750 logged flying hours, including 150 hours in retractable gear air-
craft and 15 hours in the make and model of the aircraft to be insured. Id.
462 Id. at 555.
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sured.463 Hudson's construction was reasonable because
National Union knew that the aircraft had dual controls.
Therefore, it was incumbent on the insurer to expressly
exclude simultaneous piloting from the scope of cover-
age. 464 Alternatively, the court held that coverage was
available because the instructor was acting as the "pilot"
since he was effectively in control of the Cessna through-
out its flight.465
In Avemco Insurance Co. v. McCrone,466 the court held that
the term "child" was ambiguous and could not be applied
to limit the insurer's liability to the insured's adult son
who was killed in an airplane accident.467 The insured's
policy limited liability to an insured person's parent or
child to 12% of the limit for each person, (i.e. $100,000)
but not more than $12,500. The court maintained that
the term "child" could reasonably be construed to mean
"minor child" or simply refer to the relationship to the
insured.468 Consequently, the court construed the ambig-
uous provision in favor of the insured and awarded the
full $100,000.
In Jordan v. National Accident Insurance Underwriters Inc.,469
the court refused to decide whether the insured dece-
dent's status should be determined at the moment of im-
pact or at some point before the death or injury
occurred.470 Instead, the court held that the policy was
ambiguous and construed it in favor of the insured.4 7' In
Jordan, the insured's policy expressly limited coverage to
injuries incurred while riding as a passenger (and not as a
pilot or member of the crew). Jordan had been taking a
refresher course in IFR flying from Page, an experienced
465 Id.; see Ramsay v. Maryland Am. Gen. Ins. Co., 533 S.W.2d 344, 349 (Tex.
1976).
4- Hudson Energy Co., 811 S.W.2d at 555.
465 Id.
4- 756 F. Supp. 1074 (N.D. I1. 1991).
467 Id. at 1077.
4- Id. at 1076-77.
4- 922 F.2d 732 (11 th Cir. 1991).
470 Id. at 735.
471 Id.
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instructor. The plane lost power upon final approach and
Page took the controls. Page attempted to land the plane
but it struck power lines and Jordan was killed in the ensu-
ing crash. The court held that the policy was ambiguous
because it did not define the terms "pilot," "passenger"
or "member of the crew."'472 The court noted that while
some courts have adopted the "moment of impact" test in
construing those terms,473 others have rejected it.4 74 The
court remarked that "[u]nder Alabama law, if an insur-
ance contract provision is subject to more than one inter-
pretation, it should be construed in favor of coverage, and
against the insurer.94 75
The court also noted that under Alabama law the gen-
eral rule is that the insured bears the burden of proving
coverage.476 When the insurer denies coverage under an
exclusionary clause, however, the insurer bears the bur-
den of proving that the exclusion applies.477 When the
insurer contended that the insured was not expressly cov-
ered, it was attempting to place the claim within the provi-
sion of the policy excluding all injuries arising from
aviation accidents regardless of whether the insured was
riding as a passenger or otherwise, unless coverage was
expressly provided. Because the insurer denied coverage
under an exclusionary clause, the court held that the in-
surer bore the burden of proving that the exclusion
applied.4 78
In Gonzalez v. Mission American Insurance Co. ,479 the court
held that an endorsement limiting recovery for "bodily in-
472 Id.
47- See Vander Laan v. Educators Mut. Ins. Co., 97 N.W.2d 6 (Mich. 1959).
474 See Beckwith v. American Home Assurance Co., 565 F. Supp. 458 (W.D.N.C.
1983).
475 Jordan, 922 F.2d at 735 (quoting Colbert County Hosp. Bd. v. Bellefonte Ins.
Co., 725 F.2d 651, 654 (11th Cir. 1984)).
476 Id. (citing Colonial Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Collins, 194 So. 2d 532,
535 (Ala. 1967)).
477 Id. (citing Burton v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 533 F.2d 177, 178
(5th Cir. 1976), citing Fleming v. Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Casualty Ins. Co.,
310 So. 2d 200, 202 (Ala. 1975)).
478 Id. at 736.
479 795 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. 1990).
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jury" to $100,000 per passenger did not also limit recov-
ery for death to $100,000.40 The court held that "death"
and "bodily injury" were not identical terms for coverage
purposes.48 ' Consequently, the plaintiffs were entitled to
recover up to $1,000,000, the aggregate amount of cover-
age under the policy.
2. Unambiguous Terms
In Monarch Insurance Co. v. Heatherly,482 the Supreme
Court of New York, Trial Division, held that an insured's
Agriplan Aerial Applicator's Insurance Policy did not pro-
vide third party coverage for injuries resulting from the
accidental spraying of herbicides and fungicides. 43 The
policy offered seven types of liability coverage, including
Chemical Liability. However, the insured purchased only
Bodily Injury and Property Damage coverage, both of
which expressly excluded Chemical Liability. When the
insured was subsequently sued by a neighbor for both
negligently spraying and for failing to warn of the spray-
ing, the insurer refused to defend and sought a declara-
tion of its rights. The court held that the unambiguous
language of the policy excluded coverage for accidental
spraying,484 and furthermore, the failure to warn arose
out of the use of chemicals and was similarly excluded.
In Marine Midland Leasing Corp. v. Chautauqua Airlines,
Inc. ,485 the court declared that under the clear and unam-
biguous language of the parties' lease, the lessor was enti-
tled to receive and retain the insurance proceeds from the
loss of its aircraft, to the extent that such proceeds ex-
ceeded the fair market value or casualty value of the air-
480 Id. at 736.
481 Id. at 736-37.
482 560 N.Y.S.2d 745 (1990).
485 Id. at 746.
484 Id. "No coverage applies to bodily injury which is caused by or arises out of
the use of chemicals ... [or] resulting directly or indirectly from chemicals, fertil-
izers or seeds." Id.
485 572 N.Y.S.2d 573 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
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craft, whichever was greater.48 6 Chautauqua Airlines,
Inc., the lessee, had procured insurance in an amount
clearly greater than either of those values; however,
Marine Midland, the lessor, refused to sign the proof of
loss unless it also received any excess proceeds. The
proof of loss for damage was $2.5 million and the casualty
value was $1,445,903.63. The court held that the lessee
would be entitled to any excess; however, the court remit-
ted the matter because the record lacked proof concern-
ing the fair market value of the aircraft.48 7
C. CAB ENDORSEMENT
In United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Southeast Airmotive
Corp. ,488 North Carolina Court of Appeals held an in-
surer's claim for reimbursement was not a claim which ex-
isted at the time the complaint was served in the previous
declaratory judgment action.489 Consequently, the claim
was not barred by issue preclusion. The suit arose as a
result of the crash of a Southeast Airmotive Corp. (South-
east) aircraft en route to Douglas International Airport in
Charlotte, North Carolina. Southeast tendered its de-
fense to U.S. Fire who refused the tender. Southeast ob-
tained ajudgment declaring that U.S. Fire was required to
provide coverage. U.S. Fire subsequently defended and
incurred expenses in the amount of $80,499.48.
U.S. Fire thereafter sued Southeast for reimbursement
of its litigation costs. Southeast filed a motion to dismiss,
alleging that the subject of U.S. Fire's complaint was pre-
viously joined as an issue in the prior action, and that the
subject of the complaint was in the nature of a compulsory
counterclaim which should have been brought in the prior
action and was therefore barred. The trial court granted
Southeast's motion and U.S. Fire appealed.
The court of appeals noted that the underlying policy
4- Id. at 574.
487 Id. at 574-75.
488 402 S.E.2d 466 (N.C. App.), review denied, 407 S.E.2d 553 (N.C. 1991).
489 Id. at 468.
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contained a CAB endorsement 490 and that Southeast's lia-
bility had resulted from an ambiguity in that endorse-
ment.49' The court held that a claim for reimbursement
could arise only if coverage resulted from the presence of
the CAB endorsement. 492 Therefore, a claim for reim-
bursement could not be a coverage related claim which
existed at the time of serving the complaint in the previ-
ous action. As -such, it could not be in the nature of a
compulsory counterclaim.493 The court held that the is-
sue of reimbursement was neither raised nor disposed of
in the prior action because it was distinct from the issue of
coverage.49 4 Consequently, the court determined that the
claim could not be barred by issue preclusion, reversing
the trial court's order.
D. POLICY RENEWAL
In Avemco Insurance Co. v. Medicalodges, Inc. , the court
held that the insured did not accept the insurer's offer to
renew a noncommercial aircraft policy within a reasonable
time.496 In November, 1987, the insured received an invi-
tation to renew since the policy was to expire on Decem-
ber 1, 1987. On December 11, 1987, the aircraft was
damaged when the engine was started. On December 19,
1987, the insured elected to renew the policy, but
backdated its check to December 1, 1987. The insurer de-
nied liability because it asserted the policy had expired on
December 1, 1987, and was not in force on the 11 th.
4- See 14 C.F.R. § 298.41 (1991) (requiring a CAB standard endorsement as
part of a policy of insurance). The endorsement provided: "The named insured
will promptly reimburse the insurer for payments made by the insurer which the
insurer would not have been obligated to make except for the provisions of this
endorsement." Southeast Airmotive Corp., 402 S.E.2d at 467.
491 Southeast Airmotive Corp., 402 S.E.2d at 467.
492 Id.
495 See Faggart v. Biggers, 197 S.E.2d 75, 78 (N.C. App. 1973) (a counterclaim is
compulsory when it is in existence at the time of the serving of the pleading, when
it arises out of the same transaction or occurrence, and when it does not require
the presence of third parties over whom the Court cannot acquire jurisdiction).
4- Southeast Airmotive Corp., 402 S.E.2d at 468.
495 752 F. Supp. 397 (D. Kan. 1990).
496 Id. at 398.
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The court noted that the policy did not include a clause
stating the period for which the policy extended its offer
to renew.497 The court resolved the ambiguity by impos-
ing an implied term of tendering the premium for renewal
"within a reasonable time. ' 498 The court held, however,
that the insured did not accept the insurer's offer within a
reasonable time. 499 The insured accepted the offer only
as a result of the aircraft accident. The court stated
"[a]lthough a delay of this length under different circum-
stances might be acceptance within a reasonable time, the
court has no difficulty in concluding that defendant's ac-
ceptance after the accident simply came too late." 500
E. MISCELLANEOUS
In Dickman Aviation Services v. United States Fire Insurance
Co.,° Dickman was sued for breaching a contract to pro-
vide a factory-like new Cessna 210 airplane to McKoane.
Dickman damaged the aircraft's engine during the over-
haul which resulted in an additional charge of $10,561.50.
McKoane sued Dickman, who tendered the defense to
U.S. Fire, which declined to defend the action because the
loss did not result from "an occurrence." Some time
later, McKoane served Dickman an amended complaint
alleging Dickman's negligence caused the damage. Dick-
man failed to inform U.S. Fire of the amended complaint.
Instead, the parties appeared before the court and judg-
ment was entered for McKoane. Subsequently, Dickman
sued U.S. Fire to recover the money it paid in satisfaction
of the judgment.
The court held that a liability insurer was not bound by
the judgment against the insured on the negligence count
of the amended complaint.50 2 The court noted the origi-
497 Id.
198 Id. (relying on Shepard v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 504 P.2d
228, 230 (Kan. 1972)).
4- Id. at 398.
5- Id. at 399.
50 809 S.W.2d 149 (Mo. 1991).
502 Id. at 153.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
nal complaint contained other theories of liability which
were outside the policy's coverage.5 °3 Thus, denial of
tender was proper. The insurer was not liable because
the insured had breached the terms of the policy by failing
to notify the insurer of the amended complaint and imme-
diately appearing before the court. Consequently, the
court granted the insurer's motion for summary
judgment.
XI. FAA ENFORCEMENT/LOCAL REGULATION
A. DUE PROCESS
In Atorie Air, Inc. v. Federal Aviation Administration,5 °4 the
court determined that an air cargo company had waived
procedural due process rights by relinquishing its right to
judicial review as provided for in 49 U.S.C. § 1486.505
Due to prior numerous violations of FAA safety regula-
tions, and a current air crash, the FAA's associate regional
counsel asked Atorie to voluntarily surrender the certifi-
cates necessary to its operation. 0 6 Atorie surrendered
the certificates after the FAA agreed to return the certifi-
cates as soon as Atorie complied with the regulations.
The FAA failed to timely return the certificates because it
purportedly found continued unaddressed violations.
When the FAA finally recertified Atorie and returned its
certificates, Atorie had allegedly lost all of its cargo
contracts.
Atorie sued the FAA for loss of its business. The court
determined that Atorie had negotiated with the FAA con-
I ld. at 152.
942 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 960-61. Section 1486 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Any order . . . issued by the [Federal Aeronautics] Board ...
shall be subject to review by the courts of appeals for the United
States ... upon petition.
(d) . . . [U]pon good cause shown and after reasonable notice to
the Board ... interlocutory relief may be granted by stay of the or-
der or by such mandatory or other relief as may be appropriate.
49 U.S.c. app. § 1486 (1988).
.,. See 14 C.F.R. § 121.535(d) (1991).
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cerning its compliance with agency regulations, volunta-
rily relinquished its certificates to avoid an emergency
suspension order, knowingly refrained from seeking court
review when the FAA failed to return the certificates as
promised, and, instead, attempted to restructure its busi-
ness.5 0 7 Consequently, Atorie had waived its procedural
due process rights.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit agreed that procedural due
process was available to Atorie because the FAA action
complained of could have been subject to appellate re-
view. 50 8 The court rejected Atorie's assertion that be-
cause the certificates were voluntarily surrendered, there
was never a final agency action issued. The court noted
that Atorie voluntarily surrendered its certificates and no
emergency order revoking certification had been issued
by the FAA. Therefore, Atorie had a duty to demand
their return. In the absence of a demand, the "FAA was
never obliged to justify its continued holding of the certif-
icates." 50 The court noted that had Atorie made such a
demand, "judicial review of that demand and the FAA's
refusal would have been available under section
1486(a)". 51 o
The Fifth Circuit also agreed with the district court that
Atorie had waived its procedural due process rights. The
court noted that for a waiver to take place "the record
must reflect a basis for the conclusion of actual knowledge
of the existence of the right,... full understanding of its
meaning and clear comprehension of the consequences of
waiver".5" The court stated that basis was satisfied be-
cause Atorie had retained counsel who was a former law-
yer with the FAA and was familiar with the applicable
statutes and regulations and who had determined that it
was better to cooperate with the FAA than rock the boat
507 Atorie Air, 942 F.2d at 957.
508 Id.
- Id. at 960.
510 Id.
5,1 Id. at 961 (quoting Burno v. City of Denna, 714 F.2d 484, 492-93 (5th Cir.
1983)).
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by demanding the return of the certificates. 51 2 Conse-
quently, the court held that when Atorie decided not to
avail itself of its appellate rights, waiver occurred.5 1 3
B. APPEAL
In McCarthney v. Busey,514 a divided Sixth Circuit held
that a petitioner's notice of appeal from the issuance of an
emergency revocation order did not start the running of
the sixty-day period in which the National Transportation
and Safety Board (NTSB) had to render a decision.51 5
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued emer-
gency revocation orders charging McCarthney and six
others (petitioners) with intentionally or fraudulently fal-
sifying entries in official records in violation of 14 C.F.R.
§ 61.59(a)(2). The orders were served by certified mail
on Friday, October 26, 1990, and petitioners appealed im-
mediately. Later that day, the FAA faxed the NTSB cop-
ies of its motion to consolidate the seven appeals,
enclosing with each an emergency revocation order and
advising that "[t]he Administrator had determined that an
emergency exists" as to each. 5' 6 The NTSB stamped the
motion to consolidate received on Monday, October 30,
1990, and rendered its decision fifty-nine days later on
December 28, 1990.
Petitioners argued that the sixty-day period began on
October 26, 1990, the day they filed their notice of ap-
peal. Therefore, the NTSB's action was not timely since
512 Id. at 961..
'I ld. at 961-62.
514 947 F.2d 1302 (6th Cir. 1991), modified, 954 F.2d 1147 (6th Cir. 1992).
515 The statute provides:
[T]he Secretary of Transportation advises the National Transporta-
tion Safety Board that an emergency exists and safety in air com-
merce or air transportation requires the immediate effectiveness of
his order, in which event the order .shall remain effective and the
National Transportation Safety Board shall finally dispose of the ap-
peal within sixty days after being so advised by the Secretary of
Transportation.
49 U.S.C. app. § 1429(a) (1988).
516 Busey, 947 F.2d at 1302.
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the matter was disposed of on the sixty-third day. The
court rejected this argument, holding that the petitioners'
appeal did not satisfy the statutory and regulatory re-
quirements.5 1 7 The court noted that the sixty-day period
did not run until written notification was received from
the Administrator which expressed the "emergency na-
ture of the orders. '5 1 8 That notice must be sent by the
Secretary of Transportation or the Administrator. No-
tices of appeal from petitioners were not "advice from the
Secretary" and, therefore, did not begin the running of
the sixty-day period.51 9 Conversely, the notices sent by
the FAA did satisfy the statutory requirements. Because
these latter notices were stamped received on October 30,
1990, the NTSB decision was timely.
C. FORFEITURE
In In re Forfeiture of One 1980 Cessna T 207-A,520 the Flor-
ida District Court of Appeal held forfeiture of an aircraft
was proper because the owners had knowingly violated a
registration requirement, despite their claim that they
were in the process of having the aircraft inspected and
repaired in order to obtain registration at the time of
seizure. 52 ' The owners, Inverest International, Inc. (In-
verest) and Roberto Striedinger, purchased a 1980
Cessna T-207 which displayed French registration num-
bers from a previous owner. One month after purchase,
the FAA notified the owners of the need to register the
aircraft. Twelve months later, the owners arranged to
have the aircraft repaired and registered through a fixed
base operator. The next month, pursuant to state law,522
517 Busey, 954 F.2d at 1152.
518 See Id.; 49 U.S.C. app. § 1429(a) (1988); 49 C.F.R. § 821.55(b) (1992) ("The
procedure set forth herein shall apply as of the date when the Administrator's
written advice of the emergency character of his order has been received by the
Office of Administrative Law Judges or by the Board.")
519 Busey, 954 F.2d at 1152.
520 587 So. 2d 553 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
521 Id. at 554.
522 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 329.10-11 (West 1991).
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Broward County Sheriff's Deputies seized the aircraft
when they discovered that the French registration had ex-
pired and the aircraft had not been registered with the
FAA.523
Striedinger and Inverest appealed the forfeiture on the
ground that they did not "knowingly" violate the Florida
forfeiture statute. They asserted they were in the process
of having the aircraft inspected and repaired in order to
obtain registration and furthermore, that they were not
instructed to secure registration by the FBO. The court
disagreed and instead approved the trial court's sugges-
tion that failure to register the aircraft implied some clan-
destine use. The court held that "[t]he record supports
the trial court's conclusion that appellants knew that the
plane required FAA registration and notwithstanding this,
they knowingly failed to register the plane. ' 524 Accord-
ingly, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment.
A forceful dissent argued that the majority's formula-
tion impermissibly shifted the burden of proving knowl-
edge to the party opposing forfeiture. The dissent argued
that the burden was on the party seeking forfeiture to al-
lege and prove the owners' intentional act to conceal the
owners' identity. 525 The dissent also included an "Epi-
logue To Dissent," that commented on subsequent public
knowledge that Striedinger had become a player in the
Noreiga trial because of reported drug smuggling activi-
ties. The dissent stated:
This newly reported information had no effect whatsoever
on the work of any judge on the panel as none of that in-
formation was in the trial record of the present case being
reviewed on appeal. Accordingly, should the reader con-
sider the dissent to be naive, as is the reader's privilege,
the reader does so without an understanding of appellate
review of trial records, notwithstanding the foregoing
52- Sections 329.10 and 329.11 provide that an aircraft with improper registra-
tion may be seized and forfeited under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act.
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 932.701-704 (West 1991).
524 Cessna T 207-A, 587 So. 2d at 554.
525 Id. at 556.
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explanation. 2 6
D. IMPROVEMENT GRANTS
In City and County of San Francisco v. Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration,527 the Ninth Circuit held that the FAA prop-
erly denied San Francisco airport improvement grants
under the Airport and Airway Improvements Trust
Fund.52 8 According to the court, the use of noise control
regulations by San Francisco to bar aircraft on a basis
other than noise, 529 or without a factual basis, was incon-
sistent with a fair and efficient national air transport sys-
tem.5 3 0 Furthermore, because the FAA violated the 180-
day limit on its consideration of certain grants,53 ' includ-
ing refiled grants, the court directed the FAA to approve
grants for certain years.
E. MISCELLANEOUS
InJanka v. Department of Transportation, National Transpor-
tation Safety Board,"2 the Ninth Circuit upheld a finding of
intentional falsification of a logbook entry.5 " In the con-
solidated cases, defendant Janka was charged with violat-
ing Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 91.9 for operating
an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner, FAR 91.65(a)
for creating a collision hazard, and FAR 61.59(a) for mak-
526 Id.
527 942 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1665 (1992).
528 Id. at 1393.
The Airport and Airway Improvements Trust Fund is made up of amounts
equivalent to taxes on aviation fuel and air transportation received by the Treas-
ury. See 26 U.S.C. § 9502 (1988). Money from the Trust Fund is allocated, pursu-
ant to The Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982, 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2201-
27 (1988), to finance the operation and improvement of major airports. Potential
recipients include "primary airports" like San Francisco International Airport. See
id. §§ 2202(a)(12), 2205(a)(2)(B).
- San Francisco rejected applications for retrofitted Boeing 707 airplanes even
though the noise level emitted by those airplanes met federal guidelines. See 49
U.S.C. app. §§ 1423, 1431 (1988).
520 City and County of San Francisco, 942 F.2d at 1395.
531 See 49 U.S.C. app. § 2218(b)(1) (1988).
532 925 F.2d 1147 (9th Cir. 1991).
533 Id. at 1150.
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ing an intentionally false logbook entry.53 4 Janka asserted
that he had not violated FAR 61.59(a) because he lacked
any intent to deceive. The court held that an "intent to
deceive" is only required where the violation charged is
fraudulent falsification of a logbook; whereas the ele-
ments of intentional falsification of a logbook were falsity,
knowledge, and materiality.535 Janka also asserted that
the logbook entry was not material. 536 The court adopted
the Sixth Circuit's definition of materiality53 7 and held
that a logbook entry is material if the statement was capa-
ble of influencing the Federal Aviation Administration. 53 8
Consequently, the court affirmed the Board's decision.
XII. STRICT LIABILITY
A. DANGEROUS INSTRUMENTALITIES
In Bailey v. Pennsylvania Electric Co. ,539 a Pennsylvania in-
termediate appellate court held that high voltage lines
were a dangerous instrumentality and therefore a power
company owed a high duty of care towards pilots and not
merely an ordinary duty of care.540 Bailey and Muth, pi-
lots for an air reconnaissance company hired by Penn-
sylvania Electric Company (Penelec), were engaged in a
routine patrol of a Penelec 46Kv electrical transmission
line. Their helicopter collided with an intersecting un-
marked 115Kv line and plunged to the ground killing
Muth and severely injuring Bailey. A jury found Penelec
65% at fault and Penelec moved for a judgment n.o.v.,
which the court denied.
Penelec appealed on the ground that it had no notice of
the dangerous condition. The court, however, following
54 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.9, 61.59 (1992); 14 C.F.R. § 91.65 (1989).
535 Janka, 925 F.2d at 1150.
56 The entry indicated that Janka gave one hour of instruction in August, when
in fact the instruction took place in May.
5-1 See Cassis v. Helms, 737 F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1984).
538 Janka, 925 F.2d at 1150.
119 598 A.2d 41 (Pa. 1991).
540 Id. at 43.
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Yoffee v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. ,54' held that where
there is a likelihood that an aircraft will fly by a transmis-
sion line, harm is foreseeable.5 42 The court also noted
that "the fact that Bailey and Muth were retained to per-
form flight inspections for Penelec is sufficient proof that
the power company was aware that aviation activities
would be taking place over its lines. ' 543
The court further held that high voltage transmission
lines were dangerous instrumentalities which carry a high
probability of death or serious injury if they are not prop-
erly marked with spherical line markers.5 44 The court
held Penelec was properly held to a high, not an ordinary,
duty of care because it was responsible for hundreds of
high voltage lines over which pilots fly their aircraft.54 5 In
the present case there was ample evidence for the jury to
conclude that Bailey and Muth were not alerted properly
to the presence of the intersecting transmission line. Be-
cause the jury could surmise that the insufficient warning
was the proximate cause of the helicopter crash, judgment
n.o.v. was properly denied.
B. PREEMPTION
In Green v. Industrial Helicopters, Inc.,546 the Supreme
Court of Louisiana reversed the en banc opinion of the
court of appeals547 and held that under the facts of that
instant case, state law was not preempted by, but supple-
mented general maritime law since the state law did not
"impermissibly conflict with the substantive general mari-
time law." '548 Consequently, a passenger who was injured
in a helicopter crash while being ferried from shore onto
- 123 A.2d 636 (Pa. 1956) (a wrongful death action involving the pilot of a
single engine aircraft who was killed when his aircraft collided with a transmission
line strung across the Susquehanna River by defendant at a height of 185 feet).
-2 Bailey, 598 A.2d at 46.
543 Id.
544 Id. at 46, 51.
5 Id. at 47.
546 593 So. 2d 634 (1992).
-7 576 So. 2d 1183 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
54, Green, 593 So. 2d at 636.
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an offshore production platform was entitled to recovery
under Louisiana's strict liability statute5 49 without proof of
the helicopter owner's negligence.5 5 °
The Supreme Court of Louisiana agreed that admiralty
jurisdiction was invoked because the activity at issue was
traditionally performed by waterborne vessels and in-
volved an accident on the high seas. However, the court
held that when bringing claims under a "saving to suit-
ors" 55' clause, it was not necessary to find an exact coun-
terpart to the strict liability provision of the general
maritime law.552 Instead,
[t]he proper inquiry is whether in this setting strict liability
under Louisiana law thwarts the purpose of any specific
congressional pronouncement, or "work[s] material preju-
dice to the characteristic features of maritime law or inter-
fere[s] with the proper harmony or uniformity of that law
in its international and interstate relations.553
The requirement of "no specific Congressional pro-
nouncement" was satisfied because the court found no
clearly applicable federal statute "governing the liability
of a helicopter owner to an offshore worker passenger for
injuries sustained by the passenger from a crash landing
on the high seas caused by a defective condition of the
helicopter. ' 5 4 The requirement that there be "no mate-
&9 LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2317 (West 1991).
55" Under general maritime law, a vessel owner's exposure to non-seamen pas-
sengers is predicated on the theory of negligence. Green, 593 So. 2d at 640; see
MARTINJ. NORRIS, THE LAw OF MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES, § 3:4 at 63 (4th ed.
1990).
55, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333 ("savings to suitors" clause which permits claimants to
pursue common-law remedies in state court).
552 Green, 593 So. 2d at 638. The court of appeals had held that where the rem-
edy sought under state law altered or conflicted with the maritime law which es-
tablished the substantive rights of the parties, maritime law should control. Such a
conflict existed in the present case because general maritime law required proof
of negligence by a passenger who sues a common carrier, whereas Louisiana's
strict liability statute law had no such requirement. Because plaintiff had not
proven negligence, the court of appeals dismissed plaintiff's claims. Green, 576
So. 2d at 1184.
553 Green, 593 So. 2d at 638.
554 Id.
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rial prejudice" was satisfied because
[g]iven the lack of maritime rule clearly applicable to a he-
licopter crash on the high seas and the recognition of lia-
bility in the absence of fault in the general maritime law,
[the court held that] strict custodial liability embodied in
Louisiana Civil Code article 2317 cannot be said to 'mate-
rially prejudice' characteristic features of the general mari-
time law.555
Lastly, the requirement that there be no interference with
uniformity of law was satisfied because the tangential rela-
tionship of offshore drilling to traditional maritime activi-
ties combined with strong state interest brought the case
within the "maritime but local" doctrine.556 Conse-
quently, the trial court did not err in applying state law.
XIII. NEGLIGENCE
In Rodriguez Pardo v. Delta Airlines, Inc. ,557 a federal dis-
trict court held that the plaintiffs had failed to demon-
strate any genuine issue as to any material fact upon
which a finding of liability against Delta Airlines, Inc.
(Delta)15 8 could rest and granted Delta's motion for sum-
mary judgment. The plaintiffs were paying passengers on
Delta flight 179 from San Juan to Miami. After landing in
Miami and while taxiing towards the gate, a camera case
stored by an unidentified passenger in an overhead com-
partment fell out and hit one of the plaintiffs on the back
of her neck when the passenger retrieved his belongings.
The plaintiffs alleged that Delta was negligent in failing
to ensure that the compartment was not overloaded.
However, the court noted that the plaintiffs failed to come
forward with any evidence upon which a finding of im-
proper loading could be based. 55 9 The plaintiffs further
555 Id. at 642.
556 Id. at 643. The doctrine allows the application of state law "[i]f it (can] be
said that the work activities of the injured employee have no direct concern with
navigation or commerce." Id. (citations omitted).
55, 767 F. Supp. 26 (D.P.R. 1991).
558 Id. at 29.
559 Id. at 28.
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alleged that Delta was negligent in allowing the unidenti-
fied passenger to stand while the "fasten seat belt" sign
was illuminated. However, the court noted that the plain-
tiff had not produced evidence showing that the crew
failed to order the passenger to sit down, or that there
was time for a flight attendant to instruct him to remain
seated. 560 Finally, the court noted that plaintiffs had not
produced any evidence that any Delta employee was in-
volved in Mrs. Rodriguez Pardo's injury.56' Conse-
quently, the court granted Delta's motion for summary
judgment.
In Marshall v. Western Air Lines, Inc. ,562 the Court of Ap-
peals of Washington held that the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-
tur would not relieve a plaintiff of the burden of proving
that the defendant's negligence caused the sudden
changes in cabin air pressure which allegedly harmed the
plaintiff.563 The court further maintained that an airline
had no duty to warn of hazards associated with a passen-
ger's particular condition.5 64 In Marshall, the plaintiff al-
leged Western Air Lines, Inc. (Western) had negligently
caused a sudden change in cabin air pressure while she
was a passenger aboard defendant's aircraft. The plaintiff
alleged the pressure change ruptured the membrane of
her middle ear565 which consequently restricted her lifes-
tyle in that she was no longer able to travel anywhere in-
volving a change of altitude. The trial court rejected the
plaintiff's theory and granted Western's motion for sum-
mary judgment.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Washington af-
firmed. The court noted that in order for res ipsa loquitur
to apply, the accident producing the injury must be of a
56 Id.
561 Id. at 29.
562 813 P.2d 1269, 1269 (Wash. Ct. App.), review denied, 822 P.2d 287 (Wash.
1991).
563 Id. at 1274.
564 Id. at 1275.
565 Id. at 1271. Plaintiff's medical condition was diagnosed as a perilymph fis-
tula. Id.
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kind that ordinarily does not happen in the absence of
someone's negligence. 6 6 The court held that although a
sudden, abnormal change in cabin air pressure was such
an event, the plaintiff failed to show that the change in air
pressure actually occurred. 567 Therefore, the plaintiff was
not relieved of the burden of proving her case in chief.
Additionally, the plaintiff alleged that Western failed to
warn its passengers of the risks associated with sudden
changes of air pressure in air travel and of the preventive
measures passengers can take to relieve pressure in the
ear. The court held, however, that Western had not
breached any duty to Marshall because an airline had no
duty to warn of risks relating to a passenger's particular
condition. 56 The court noted that the only type of warn-
ing that might have helped Marshall was a notice before
the flight that a very small percentage of individuals, for a
variety of reasons, may suffer permanent ear damage due
to normal pressure changes. 569 Even if such a warning
was given, there was no evidence that Marshall's injuries
would have been prevented because Marshall was not
aware of any inner ear problems. Therefore, Marshall's
claim on the theory of duty to warn would fail on the cau-
sation element.
In Martin Marietta Corp. v. INTELSA T,5 7° the court held
that a provider of private launch services had no duty in
tort for losses arising out of a failed satellite launch.5
Furthermore, the court held that a contractual waiver to
claims based on gross negligence was consistent with con-
gressional intent requiring parties to assume the risk of
their own loss. 572 In August, 1987, INTELSAT con-
5- Id. at 1273 (quoting Adams v. Western Host, Inc., 779 P.2d 281, 285 (Wash.
App. 1989)).
567 Id..
568 Id. at 1275; see Sprayregen v. American Airlines, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 16
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (no duty to warn a passenger of the hazards of flying with a head
cold).
569 Id.
570 763 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Md. 1991).
571 Id. at 1333.
572 Id. at 1330.
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tracted with Martin Marietta for the launch of two INTEL-
SAT satellites on Titan III launch rockets. The first
launch was unsuccessful because the satellite failed to sep-
arate from the rocket at the correct time and could not be
boosted into the proper orbit. INTELSAT sustained sub-
stantial losses due to the failure of the mission to position
the satellite correctly.573 Martin Marietta brought an ac-
tion seeking a declaratory judgment absolving it of any li-
ability for the incident. INTELSAT counterclaimed,
asserting a breach of contract, and alleging negligence,
gross negligence and negligent misrepresentation.
The court rejected Martin Marietta's assertion that the
Commercial Space Launch Act (CSLA)5 74 created liability
waivers for contracts in which the parties failed to ex-
pressly agree upon any waivers.575 The court agreed that
the CSLA required that the licensee include cross-waivers
in its contract.5 76 However, as a consequence of the fail-
ure to include cross-waivers, the Department of Transpor-
tation could revoke the license. Nothing in the CSLA
imputed cross-waivers into the contract.5 77 In fact, the
court noted that Martin Marietta's license required it to
certify to the Office of Commercial Space Transportation
that it would indemnify and be responsible for liability if it
failed to enter or include the cross-waivers.578
Although the CSLA did not absolve Martin Marietta of
liability, the court held that INTELSAT's tort claims were
573 Id. at 1329. INTELSAT paid Martin Marietta approximately $112 million for
the launch prices alone, and experts estimated that the cost of rescuing the satel-
lite may be as high as $90 million. Additionally, the satellite does not function at
its present orbit and is useless. Id.
-74 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2601-2623 (1988). The statute was enacted to reverse the
virtual shut-down of the private commercial space launch industry brought about
because commercial launchers incurred huge liability risks and were unable to
procure insurance at any price. It requires all licensed private launch providers to
enter into reciprocal waivers of claims, under which all parties agree to assume
their own risks of loss.
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invalid in light of the specific contractual obligations.5 7 9
The court noted that "[e]qually sophisticated parties who
have the opportunity to allocate risks to third party insur-
ance or among one another should be held to only those
duties specified by the agreed upon contractual terms and
not to general tort duties imposed by state law."5' 0 Ap-
plying Maryland law, the court dismissed INTELSAT's
claim for negligent misrepresentation because no rela-
tionship of special trust existed between the parties.58 '
INTELSAT was not unsophisticated and the contract did
not impose any duty of due care.
The court also rejected INTELSAT's assertion that
public policy invalidated contractual waivers of gross neg-
ligence. The court noted that Congress intended the
waivers required by the CSLA to bar recovery in all in-
stances, including gross negligence.58 2 The court found
that "[t]hose who seek to explore, and to exploit, outer
space must do so charged with acceptance of the un-
known, and perhaps unknowable, perils to be faced in that
vast and potentially hostile environment.' '583
In Broussard v. Paul Fournet Air Service, Inc. ,584 the court
held that the owner of a private aircraft, which flipped and
was destroyed in a sudden windstorm, failed to prove that
an FBO was negligent in not tying down the plane.58 5
The court noted that the owner had been notified that the
FBO would not maintain the tie-down ropes. Further-
more, the court held that the accident was caused by an
overpowering force and the FBO was not liable for any
519 Id. at 1333-34.
58o Id. at 1332.
58' Id. at 1333; see Flow Indust. v. Fields Const. Co., 683 F. Supp. 527 (D. Md.
1988) (a claim for negligent misrepresentation is improper when the only rela-
tionship between the parties is contractual, both parties are equally sophisticated,
and the contract does not create an express duty of due care in making
representations).
582 INTELSAT, 763 F. Supp. at 1333.
583 Id. at 1334.
584 574 So. 2d 541 (La. Ct. App. 1991).





In In re Pan Am Corp. ,587 plaintiffs, whose decedents died
when Flight 103 crashed over Lockerbie, Scotland,
brought suit against Pan Am in Florida state court. Pan
Am, debtors in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding,
sought to transfer the action to the Southern District of
New York under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5). 588 The court rec-
ognized that Pan Am's strategy was then to move for the
panel on multidistrict litigation to transfer the action to
the Eastern District of New York where similar cases were
pending.58 9 The court noted that, because Florida had
not yet held that the Warsaw Convention provided the ex-
clusive remedy for injuries sustained during international
air transportation, 590 punitive damages might be recover-
able. However, New York courts had held that the War-
saw Convention preempted state law causes of action and
so precluded recovery of punitive damages.5 9 '
The court found the reasoning of In re White Motor
Credit 5 92 to be persuasive. There, the Sixth Circuit had
questioned the equity of forcing a debtor to face tort liti-
gation in a foreign forum. The White Motor Credit court
held that "the fact that section 157(b)(4) of title 28
586 Id. at 543.
-7 128 B.R. 59 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 950 F.2d 8839 (2d Cir.
1991).
511 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (1988) provides:
The district court shall order that personal injury tort and wrongful
death claims shall be tried in the district court in which the bank-
ruptcy case is pending, or in the district court in the district in which
the claim arose, as determined by the district court in which the
bankruptcy is pending.
Id.
589 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988).
- See Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, 872 F.2d 1462, 1482 n.33 (1 th Cir. 1989),
rev'd, Ill S.Ct. 1489 (1991).
-91 In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie Scotland on Dec. 21, 1988, 1928 F.2d 1267
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 331 (1991).
592 761 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1985).
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removes tort cases from mandatory abstention under sec-
tion 1334(c)(2) but does not remove discretionary absten-
tion under 1334(c)(1), convinces us that the district court
has the authority to leave tort cases in the courts in which
they are pending for liquidation there. ' 593 The Pan Am
court found that this reasoning was equally compelling
when applied to a tort plaintiff in an action against a
debtor. The court held that discretionary abstention
under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(€)(1) created the authority to
leave tort cases in the courts in which they are pending. 594
Therefore, notwithstanding the language of 28 U.S.C.
§ 157, the court deemed abstention was proper and de-
nied Pan Am's motion to transfer.59 5
B. MISCELLANEOUS
In The Connecticut National Bank v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc.,596 the court granted Connecticut National Bank's
(CNB) motion for summary judgment, determining that
Trans World Airlines, Inc. (TWA) was not excused from
performing its contractual obligations.59 7 The lawsuit
arose out of a 1986 Equipment Trust Agreement (the
Agreement) between CNB and TWA which provided that
CNB would purchase ten aircraft and approximately
ninety-six jet engines from TWA, then lease them back to
TWA until February 1, 1996. In connection with the
Agreement, CNB received notes with an aggregate princi-
pal amount of $312 million. TWA met its obligations un-
til January 31, 1991 at which time it failed to make
payments of approximately $57 million. As provided by
the Agreement, CNB demanded the return of the aircraft
and engines as well as immediate payment of the out-
standing balance on the notes. TWA did not make any
payments and did not return CNB's property.
593 Id. at 273.
5- Pan Am Corp., 128 B.R. at 64.
595 Id. at 65.
5- 762 F. Supp. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
597 Id. at 81.
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CNB moved for summary judgment seeking specific
performance in accordance with the Agreement's default
remedies. TWA opposed the summary judgment, assert-
ing that it had not been afforded an adequate opportunity
to conduct discovery. The court noted, however, that
TWA did not suggest what additional evidence it needed
to obtain. 9 8 Consequently, the court rejected TWA's na-
ked assertion that the matter was too important to enter-
tain a summary judgment. 59 9
TWA next asserted that it would be inequitable to re-
quire it to return the property in light of the tremendous
ramifications such an order might have on both TWA and
the public. The court refused to accept this argument,
noting that New York law permits a secured creditor to
sue on a debt or foreclose on the collateral. 600 The court
stated that "CNB is more than a secured creditor, it actu-
ally owns the property. It would defy logic for [CNB's]
rights to be more limited than those of a secured creditor,
especially when the Agreement specifically affords CNB
this remedy. '60 ' The court also rejected TWA's sugges-
tion that CNB would be adequately protected if it secured
a money judgment, commenting that "[i]f TWA had the
money, it presumably would not have defaulted in the first
place. 602
Finally, the court rejected TWA's argument that it
should be excused from satisfying the contract because
the Persian Gulf War resulted in decreased air travel and
increased oil prices, curtailing its cash flow. The court
noted TWA could have negotiated for a force majeure
clause 60 3 in the contract to protect itself in the event of
598 Id. at 79. The court held there was no merit to the claim that CNB was a
"naked trustee" and that further discovery would change that conclusion. Id.
599 Id.
600 Id. at 80; see N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-503 (McKinney 1990); MGD Graphic Sys., Inc.
v. New York Press Publishing Co., 52 A.D.2d 815 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976), aff'd, 368
N.E.2d 835 (N.Y. 1977).
601 Connecticut National Bank, 762 F. Supp. at 80.
602 Id.
-1s The clause would have protected "the parties in the event that a part of the
contract [could] not be performed due to causes which [were] outside the control
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such circumstances. Moreover, the court held that the im-
possibility defense was precluded because "all of the al-
leged factors impacting upon TWA's profits were clearly
foreseeable and simply represent the risk of doing busi-
ness in an international forum. 60 4
XV. FREQUENT FLYER PROGRAMS
In TWA, Inc. v. American Coupon Exchange, Inc. ,6o5 the
Ninth Circuit addressed the legal issues surrounding the
enforceability of TWA's tariffs restricting the transfer of
frequent flyer awards.60 6 American Coupon Exchange,
Inc.(ACE), a frequent flyer brokerage house, appealed
from a district court order enjoining its operations.60 7
ACE asserted that the transfer restrictions constituted an
unreasonable restraint on the alienation of property. The
court noted that "the novelty and complexity of the fac-
tual setting in which this case arises makes summary judg-
ment on the reasonableness issue inappropriate on
anything less than an exhaustive investigation of the eco-
nomic realities of the matter. ' 60 8 Thus, because the dis-
trict court resorted to speculation in important areas of
inquiry, summary judgment was inappropriate.
The district court determined that the policy against re-
straints on alienation of property applied to TWA's tariff
because the coupons embodied property rights. The
Ninth Circuit, however, held the coupons were "contract
rights" rather than "property rights.16 0 9 The court relied
of the parties and could not be avoided by exercise of due care." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 581 (5th ed. 1979).
6 Connecticut National Bank, 762 F. Supp. at 81.
'o 913 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1990).
60i Id. at 678-79. The restriction limited transfer of coupons to persons other
than a family member, legal dependent, or specified relative; and voided certifi-
cates transferred to any other party. Id.
7 TWA, Inc. v. American Coupon Exch., Inc., 682 F. Supp. 1476, 1484 (C.D.
Cal. 1988), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 913 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1990) (granting
TWA's motion for summary judgment and ordering a permanent injunction
against ACE, but staying all injunctive relief pending appeal).
608 American Coupon Exchange, 913 F.2d at 684.
- Id. at 685.
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on analogous cases involving restrictions on transfers of
railroad6 t0 and theater tickets61' in which the courts held
that such issues involved contract rights. Furthermore,
the court noted that "since a frequent flyer award coupon
is not even a ticket; it is merely the right to receive a ticket
upon redemption of the coupon .... this further militates
against classifying these awards as 'property rights'. 61 2
In Greenberg v. United Airlines,6 t3 the trial court dismissed
the plaintiffs' claim for negligent misrepresentation aris-
ing out of the Mileage Plus program. The plaintiffs al-
leged that by changing the terms of its Mileage Plus
frequent flyers program in 1988, United negligently mis-
represented the terms of the 1981 Mileage Plus program
in which the plaintiffs were already enrolled. The appel-
late court held that because the plaintiffs were unable to
allege any injuries suffered, the case was properly
dismissed.
610 See Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Caffrey, 128 F. Supp. 770 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1904)
("The complaining parties have the right to sell round-trip and commutation tick-
ets over their respective roads at reduced rates, on condition that they shall only
be good in the hands of the original purchasers and shall not be transferred. Con-
tracts of this sort between a carrier and its passengers are lawful." Id. at 772 (emphasis
added)).
611 Collister v. Hayman, 76 N.E. 20 (N.Y. 1905) (Provision on back of Knicker-
bocker Theater ticket stating "if sold on the sidewalk, this ticket will be refused at
the door." Id. at 20).
612 American Coupon Exchange, 913 F.2d at 688.
61 3 563 N.E.2d 1031 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 571 N.E.2d 148 (11. 1991).
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